Safeguards training course: Nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants

Title: Safeguards training course: Nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants

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Abstract

The main objective of this training course is to provide the course participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. As background information, a variety of enrichment technologies will first be characterized and compared followed by a review of basic cascade, gas centrifuge, and gaseous diffusion theory. To focus on gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion technology, the major components and systems of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment plants including their function in routine LEU production will be identified. The objectives of safeguards at an enrichment plant, including those agreed to in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project, will then be described. Discussion will then focus on potential diversion scenarios at both a centrifuge and diffusion enrichment facility and applicable safeguards inspection activities for detecting these scenarios.

Publication Date:: 1990-06-01

Research Org.:: Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, TN (USA)

Sponsoring Org.:: DOE/NE

OSTI Identifier:: 6842813

Report Number(s):: K/ITP-343-Pt.1; CONF-9006192-Pt.1
ON: DE90011999

DOE Contract Number:: AC05-84OT21400

Resource Type:: Conference

Resource Relation:: Conference: Safeguards training course on nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants, Luxembourg (Luxembourg), 18-22 Jun 1990

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; SAFEGUARDS; URANIUM; ENRICHMENT; CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS; GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS; HISTORICAL ASPECTS; MANUALS; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; PILOT PLANTS; TRAINING; ACTINIDES; DOCUMENT TYPES; ELEMENTS; FUNCTIONAL MODELS; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; MANAGEMENT; METALS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 055000* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability; 050500 - Nuclear Fuels- Uranium Enrichment

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@article{osti_6842813,

  title        = {Safeguards training course: Nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants},

  author       = {},

  abstractNote = {The main objective of this training course is to provide the course participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. As background information, a variety of enrichment technologies will first be characterized and compared followed by a review of basic cascade, gas centrifuge, and gaseous diffusion theory. To focus on gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion technology, the major components and systems of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment plants including their function in routine LEU production will be identified. The objectives of safeguards at an enrichment plant, including those agreed to in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project, will then be described. Discussion will then focus on potential diversion scenarios at both a centrifuge and diffusion enrichment facility and applicable safeguards inspection activities for detecting these scenarios.},

  doi          = {},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6842813},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {1990},

  month        = {6}

}

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