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Title: Testing weapons in space

Abstract

The Antiballistic-Missile Treaty seems to forbid the testing of ABM weapons in space, but the US has pushed for a broad interpretation of the language. Would a more permissive regime really serve US interests This paper reviews the rationale of the treaty's provisions to help answer this question. Four modes of testing a space weapon are treated differently by the ABM treaty: (1) an orbiting weapon intercepts a ballistic weapon is flight; (2) intercepting weapon is launched on a suborbital flight; (3) both weapon and target are placed in space; and (4) orbiting weapon is aimed at an aircraft in flight or a target on the ground. Three approaches to negotiating an agreement to limit testing weapons in space are discussed. They differ in the strictness of the limits.

Authors:
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
6755189
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Scientific American; (USA); Journal Volume: 261:1
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; SPACE WEAPONS; TESTING; TREATIES; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; MISSILES; NEGOTIATION; SPACE FLIGHT; USA; USSR; AGREEMENTS; ASIA; EASTERN EUROPE; EUROPE; NORTH AMERICA 350101* -- Arms Control-- Policy, Negotiations, & Legislation-- Treaties-- (1987-)

Citation Formats

Carter, A.B. Testing weapons in space. United States: N. p., 1989. Web. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0789-33.
Carter, A.B. Testing weapons in space. United States. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0789-33.
Carter, A.B. 1989. "Testing weapons in space". United States. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0789-33.
@article{osti_6755189,
title = {Testing weapons in space},
author = {Carter, A.B.},
abstractNote = {The Antiballistic-Missile Treaty seems to forbid the testing of ABM weapons in space, but the US has pushed for a broad interpretation of the language. Would a more permissive regime really serve US interests This paper reviews the rationale of the treaty's provisions to help answer this question. Four modes of testing a space weapon are treated differently by the ABM treaty: (1) an orbiting weapon intercepts a ballistic weapon is flight; (2) intercepting weapon is launched on a suborbital flight; (3) both weapon and target are placed in space; and (4) orbiting weapon is aimed at an aircraft in flight or a target on the ground. Three approaches to negotiating an agreement to limit testing weapons in space are discussed. They differ in the strictness of the limits.},
doi = {10.1038/scientificamerican0789-33},
journal = {Scientific American; (USA)},
number = ,
volume = 261:1,
place = {United States},
year = 1989,
month = 7
}
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