Stockpile reliability and nuclear test bans: Response to J. W. Rosengren's defense of his 1983 report
A response is given to the defense by J.W. Rosengren of his report that argues that, judging from past experience, a ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons could be expected to severely undercut the capability of the US to maintain a reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. The response advances the view that none of the examples cited in the Rosengren report support the thesis that nuclear explosive testing is necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability of the existing US stockpile of thoroughly tested nuclear weapons. It is argued that no nuclear tests were required either to identify or to correct problems encountered in stockpile with the W56, W58, and W68. It is further argued that the W45, W47, and W52 were not adequately tested prior to stockpile entry. It is finally concluded that, if indeed there are nuclear weapons in the stockpile that have not been thoroughly tested, then those should be identified and appropriate corrective action taken. (LEW)
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 6646647
- Report Number(s):
- UCID-20990; ON: DE87006877
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Maintaining the US stockpile of nuclear weapons during a Low-Threshold or Comprehensive Test Ban
Maintaining the US stockpile of nuclear weapons during a test ban
Related Subjects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
RELIABILITY
TESTING
TREATIES
WEAPONS
450202* - Explosions & Explosives- Nuclear- Weaponry- (-1989)
350101 - Arms Control- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation- Treaties- (1987-)