State taxation policies: the problem for power plant siting. Working paper No. 45. [Pennsylvania and New Jersey]
Abstract
During the past decade, the siting of energy facilities has been increasingly hampered by local community resistance. It is generally recognized that the problem of securing local acceptance to the construction and operation of power facilities emerges because socio-economic costs perceived by the host community exceed their perceived socioeconomic benefits. Specifically, while the total social benefits derived from power generation are enjoyed over a wide geographic area, it is the host community that bears the majority of the resulting economic, environmental and social costs. Currently, no satisfactory alternative exists in any state for mitigating such inequities. This paper analyzes two of the most extreme tax-reimbursement schemes currently in effect in the U.S. In Pennsylvania, existing statewide pecuniary redistribution mechanisms between utility companies and local communities contain an inherent institutional bias benefiting heavily populated metropolitan areas rather than distributing tax relief based on location of power facilities. On the other hand, New Jersey's regulations penalize those communities not hosting power facilities (either by choice or geographic or demographic restrictions) by virtually excluding these areas from participating in the enormous financial benefits associated with the construction and operation of power facilities. This paper analyzes the Pennsylvania and New Jersey experiences and addressesmore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park (USA). Center for the Study of Environmental Policy
- OSTI Identifier:
- 6646096
- Report Number(s):
- NP-23395
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; NEW JERSEY; POWER PLANTS; PENNSYLVANIA; SITE SELECTION; TAXES; COAL; COMMUNITIES; CONSTRUCTION; ECONOMIC IMPACT; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS; FOSSIL-FUEL POWER PLANTS; IMPLEMENTATION; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS; OPERATION; PUBLIC OPINION; RECOMMENDATIONS; SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS; STATE GOVERNMENT; URBAN AREAS; CARBONACEOUS MATERIALS; CENTRAL REGION; ENERGY SOURCES; FOSSIL FUELS; FUELS; INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS; MID-ATLANTIC REGION; NORTH AMERICA; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; THERMAL POWER PLANTS; USA; 296000* - Energy Planning & Policy- Electric Power; 293000 - Energy Planning & Policy- Policy, Legislation, & Regulation
Citation Formats
Brownstein, A B, and Gregor, J J. State taxation policies: the problem for power plant siting. Working paper No. 45. [Pennsylvania and New Jersey]. United States: N. p., 1978.
Web.
Brownstein, A B, & Gregor, J J. State taxation policies: the problem for power plant siting. Working paper No. 45. [Pennsylvania and New Jersey]. United States.
Brownstein, A B, and Gregor, J J. 1978.
"State taxation policies: the problem for power plant siting. Working paper No. 45. [Pennsylvania and New Jersey]". United States.
@article{osti_6646096,
title = {State taxation policies: the problem for power plant siting. Working paper No. 45. [Pennsylvania and New Jersey]},
author = {Brownstein, A B and Gregor, J J},
abstractNote = {During the past decade, the siting of energy facilities has been increasingly hampered by local community resistance. It is generally recognized that the problem of securing local acceptance to the construction and operation of power facilities emerges because socio-economic costs perceived by the host community exceed their perceived socioeconomic benefits. Specifically, while the total social benefits derived from power generation are enjoyed over a wide geographic area, it is the host community that bears the majority of the resulting economic, environmental and social costs. Currently, no satisfactory alternative exists in any state for mitigating such inequities. This paper analyzes two of the most extreme tax-reimbursement schemes currently in effect in the U.S. In Pennsylvania, existing statewide pecuniary redistribution mechanisms between utility companies and local communities contain an inherent institutional bias benefiting heavily populated metropolitan areas rather than distributing tax relief based on location of power facilities. On the other hand, New Jersey's regulations penalize those communities not hosting power facilities (either by choice or geographic or demographic restrictions) by virtually excluding these areas from participating in the enormous financial benefits associated with the construction and operation of power facilities. This paper analyzes the Pennsylvania and New Jersey experiences and addresses the issue in terms of a Pigouvian externality problem. An alternative distribution mechanism to avoid existing impediments to energy-facility siting as well as existing inequities is also presented.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6646096},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon May 01 00:00:00 EDT 1978},
month = {Mon May 01 00:00:00 EDT 1978}
}