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Title: Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants

Abstract

Over a two and one-half year period beginning in 1981, representatives of six countries (United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, The Netherlands, and Japan) and the inspectorate organizations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM developed and agreed to a technically sound approach for verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This effort, known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), led to the first international concensus on techniques and requirements for effective verification of the absence of weapons-grade nuclear materials production. Since that agreement, research and development has continued on the radiation detection technology-based technique that technically confirms the HSP goal is achievable. However, the realities of achieving the HSP goal of effective technical verification have not yet been fully attained. Issues such as design and operating conditions unique to each gas centrifuge plant, concern about the potential for sensitive technology disclosures, and on-site support requirements have hindered full implementation and operator support of the HSP agreement. In future arms control treaties that may limit or monitor fissile material production, the negotiators must recognize and account for the realities and practicalities in verifying the absence of HEU production. This papermore » will describe the experiences and realities of trying to achieve the goal of developing and implementing an effective approach for verifying the absence of HEU production. 3 figs.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, TN (USA)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE/DP
OSTI Identifier:
6305486
Report Number(s):
K/ITP-327; CONF-900384-3
ON: DE91006691
DOE Contract Number:  
AC05-84OT21400
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: American Physical Society meeting, Anaheim, CA (USA), 12-16 Mar 1990
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR; VERIFICATION; ACCOUNTABILITY; HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM; IMPLEMENTATION; SAFEGUARDS; ACTINIDES; ELEMENTS; ENRICHED URANIUM; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS; METALS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; URANIUM; 055000* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability

Citation Formats

Swindle, D W. Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. United States: N. p., 1990. Web.
Swindle, D W. Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. United States.
Swindle, D W. 1990. "Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6305486.
@article{osti_6305486,
title = {Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants},
author = {Swindle, D W},
abstractNote = {Over a two and one-half year period beginning in 1981, representatives of six countries (United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, The Netherlands, and Japan) and the inspectorate organizations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM developed and agreed to a technically sound approach for verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This effort, known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), led to the first international concensus on techniques and requirements for effective verification of the absence of weapons-grade nuclear materials production. Since that agreement, research and development has continued on the radiation detection technology-based technique that technically confirms the HSP goal is achievable. However, the realities of achieving the HSP goal of effective technical verification have not yet been fully attained. Issues such as design and operating conditions unique to each gas centrifuge plant, concern about the potential for sensitive technology disclosures, and on-site support requirements have hindered full implementation and operator support of the HSP agreement. In future arms control treaties that may limit or monitor fissile material production, the negotiators must recognize and account for the realities and practicalities in verifying the absence of HEU production. This paper will describe the experiences and realities of trying to achieve the goal of developing and implementing an effective approach for verifying the absence of HEU production. 3 figs.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6305486}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1990},
month = {Thu Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1990}
}

Conference:
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