skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden

Abstract

The circumstances for the protection of nuclear power plants are special in Sweden. A very important factor is that armed guards at the facilities are alien to the Swedish society. They do not use them. The Swedish concept of physical protection accepts that the aggressor will get into the facility. With this in mind, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) has established the policy that administrative, technical, and organizational measures will be directed toward preventing an aggressor from damaging the reactor, even if he has occupied the facility. In addition, the best conditions possible shall be established for the operator and the police to reoccupy the plant. The author believes this policy is different from that of many other countries. Therefore, he focusses on the Swedish philosophy and techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SE)
OSTI Identifier:
6241601
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: JNMM; (United States); Journal Volume: 16:2
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; SECURITY PERSONNEL; NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; SWEDEN; ENERGY POLICY; NATIONAL DEFENSE; RADIATION TRANSPORT; TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT; EUROPE; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; PERSONNEL; POWER PLANTS; SCANDINAVIA; THERMAL POWER PLANTS; WESTERN EUROPE 055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability; 290600 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy

Citation Formats

Dufva, B. Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden. United States: N. p., 1988. Web.
Dufva, B. Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden. United States.
Dufva, B. 1988. "Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_6241601,
title = {Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden},
author = {Dufva, B.},
abstractNote = {The circumstances for the protection of nuclear power plants are special in Sweden. A very important factor is that armed guards at the facilities are alien to the Swedish society. They do not use them. The Swedish concept of physical protection accepts that the aggressor will get into the facility. With this in mind, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) has established the policy that administrative, technical, and organizational measures will be directed toward preventing an aggressor from damaging the reactor, even if he has occupied the facility. In addition, the best conditions possible shall be established for the operator and the police to reoccupy the plant. The author believes this policy is different from that of many other countries. Therefore, he focusses on the Swedish philosophy and techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants.},
doi = {},
journal = {JNMM; (United States)},
number = ,
volume = 16:2,
place = {United States},
year = 1988,
month = 1
}
  • The Atomic Energy Commission has established a special committee on physical protection to investigate an appropriate physical protection system in Japan. This takes into account the increased amount of nuclear material in Japan and the recommendation on physical protection of nuclear material by the IAEA in 1975. In 1977 the special committee provided an interim report, followed by government instructions, on the physical protection of all nuclear facilities in Japan. In 1980, the committee provided the final report, which included the guidelines on physical protection and an outline which is attached in the Appendix to this paper. These guidelines aremore » basically comparable to INFCIRC255/Rev. 1 and clarify the responsibilities of facility operators, the regulatory authority, and the law enforcement authority. One important consideration in building a physical protection system is to rely upon hardware devices to the maximum extent. Important devices necessary for the physical protection system are represented by barriers, entry/exit control devices, surveillance devices, intrusion detection devices, tamper indication devices, and monitoring/communication systems. Although the depth of defense is different, most devices are not specific to physical protection but common in all security businesses for tanks, airports, computers, communication systems, etc.« less
  • Adequate physical protection measures are required by law as a licensing prerequisite for all transporters of nuclear materials and for all nuclear installations such as nuclear power plants, enrichment, fuel fabrication, storage, and reprocessing facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany (RFG). The objective of these measures is to prevent the following: Any risk to health and safety of the public that might be caused by direct radiation exposure or by significant release of radioactive substances through sabotage or other criminal acts; Any single or repeated theft or robbery of nuclear materials in quantities sufficient for the construction of amore » critical assembly. This paper describes the integrated physical protection concept, which is the basis for the measures to be implemented by the applicant and the state authorities. A general overview of the vulnerability analysis and examples of various physical protection measures for nuclear facilities and for transportation of nuclear material follows.« less
  • For forty years, France has been developing nuclear energy applications to the highest degree. The share of nuclear-generated electricity in the national production reached 70% in 1986. The industry has utilized all steps of the fuel cycle. France is fully aware of the risks in using nuclear energy and has taken technical and regulatory precaution to prevent malevolent acts, yet is prepared to deal with them should they occur. Physical protection measures in France to prevent sabotage and theft of nuclear material are reviewed briefly in this paper.
  • The physical protection in Czechoslovakia/CSSR is understood as one of the basic conditions for the safe utilization of nuclear energy. From this point of view, the physical protection measures are part of the nuclear safety requirements. The Nuclear Safety law is the basic legal document for the physical protection area. In CSSR a very tight connection between the physical protection system and the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nulcear Material/SSAC is also established. Combining regulatory activities in the field of nuclear safety, accountancy for and control of nuclear materials and physical protection into one complex system enablesmore » the minimization of unauthorized removal of nuclear material. This minimizes the possibility of sabotage and also implements effective protection against both inside and external threats. The physical protection is a very important complementary measure to the other ones which assure low risks from the technical and human failures.« less
  • From the physical protection view, the development and use of nuclear energy in Spain is characterized by a predominance of nuclear power stations of the light water reactor variety. The only exception is Vandellos I, which is a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor of French origin. This means that most of the nuclear materials handled in Spain are in Category III in the IAEA classification system. the above does not mean that other types of nuclear materials are not used in the National Research Center and other institutions, but such amounts cannot be considered significant. In this paper, the authorsmore » introduce and discuss the main aspects of physical protection in relation to cases in Spain. There is an analysis of ''the nature of the problem'', followed by the solutions given from the legal and technological point of view. Some figures on the cost of physical security are given, and the problems importing countries will encounter in physical protection are addressed. This paper ends with some salient conclusions.« less