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Title: Structural properties of the material control and accounting system

Abstract

A unified digraph approach is proposed for the assessment of the structure of the MC and A System. The approach emphasizes the two structural aspects of the system: vulnerability and reliability. Vulnerability is defined as a possibility of loosing connectedness in a given structure due to line and/or node removals. It is purely deterministic notion which leads to a qualitative analysis of redundancy of connections in the corresponding system. Reliability of the MC and A System structure provides a more quantitative way of assessing how safe the system is to random failures of the links representing lines of communication, material paths, monitors, and the components of the power supply network. By assigning probabilities to the lines and nodes of the corresponding digraph, the least reliable path can be used as a measure of the goodness of the system, which can be computed by efficient shortest path algorithms. Both vulnerability and reliability considerations are important in determining the effect of tampering of an adversary with the elements of the MC and M System.

Publication Date:
Research Org.:
California Univ., Livermore (USA). Lawrence Livermore Lab.
OSTI Identifier:
6085991
Report Number(s):
UCID-18107
TRN: 79-019197
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; ACCOUNTING; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; ADVERSARIES; RELIABILITY; VULNERABILITY; MANAGEMENT; 055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability- Technical Aspects

Citation Formats

Not Available. Structural properties of the material control and accounting system. United States: N. p., 1978. Web. doi:10.2172/6085991.
Not Available. Structural properties of the material control and accounting system. United States. doi:10.2172/6085991.
Not Available. Fri . "Structural properties of the material control and accounting system". United States. doi:10.2172/6085991. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6085991.
@article{osti_6085991,
title = {Structural properties of the material control and accounting system},
author = {Not Available},
abstractNote = {A unified digraph approach is proposed for the assessment of the structure of the MC and A System. The approach emphasizes the two structural aspects of the system: vulnerability and reliability. Vulnerability is defined as a possibility of loosing connectedness in a given structure due to line and/or node removals. It is purely deterministic notion which leads to a qualitative analysis of redundancy of connections in the corresponding system. Reliability of the MC and A System structure provides a more quantitative way of assessing how safe the system is to random failures of the links representing lines of communication, material paths, monitors, and the components of the power supply network. By assigning probabilities to the lines and nodes of the corresponding digraph, the least reliable path can be used as a measure of the goodness of the system, which can be computed by efficient shortest path algorithms. Both vulnerability and reliability considerations are important in determining the effect of tampering of an adversary with the elements of the MC and M System.},
doi = {10.2172/6085991},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Dec 01 00:00:00 EST 1978},
month = {Fri Dec 01 00:00:00 EST 1978}
}

Technical Report:

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  • Results are presented of NRC Task Force investigations to identify the functions of a safeguards program in relation to the NRC safeguards objective, define the role and objectives of material control and material accounting systems within that program, develop goals for material control and material accounting based on those roles and objectives, assess current material control and material accounting requirements and performance levels in the light of the goals, and recommend future actions needed to attain the proposed goals. It was found that the major contribution of material accounting to the safeguards program is in support of the assurance function.more » It also can make secondary contributions to the prevention and response functions. In the important area of loss detection, a response measure, it is felt that limitations inherent in material accounting for some fuel cycle operations limit its ability to operate as a primary detection system to detect a five formula kilogram loss with high assurance (defined by the Task Force as a probability of detection of 90 percent or more) and that, in those cases, material accounting can act only in a backup role. Physical security and material control must make the primary contributions to the prevention and detection of theft, so that safeguards do not rely primarily for detection capabilities on material accounting. There are several areas of accounting that require more emphasis than is offered by the current regulatory base. These areas include: timely shipper-receiver difference analysis and reconciliation; a demand physical inventory capability; improved loss localization;discard measurement verification; timely recovery of scrap; improved measurement and record systems; and limits on cumulative inventory differences and shipper-receiver differences. An increased NRC capability for monitoring and analyzing licensee accounting data and more timely and detailed submittals of data to NRC by licensees are recommended.« less
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  • This report provides guidance for incorporating checks and balances in a nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A) system to control and detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal diversion of nuclear material. Data falsifications may be difficult to distinguish from mistakes in the data. The elements of control for data falsification are similar to existing security and accounting internal controls. Potential mechanisms for data falsification are identified and internal controls are discussed. Process monitoring systems supplement traditional MC and A by providing more timely detection of diversion and improved localization of losses, thereby providing additional controlsmore » against data falsification. However, there is a tradeoff in that personnel who have access to material are generating data for MC and A. Possibilities for collusion involving a person having both physical protection and MC and A responsibilities and another person having MC and A responsibilities are identified. Methods for protecting the system against a collusion threat are discussed.« less