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Title: Treaty verification with an uncertain partner

Abstract

A simple model is used to analyze the performance of a system for verifying compliance with an arms control treaty. Blue and Red are partners in to a treaty. Blue prefers to comply, but is uncertain whether Red similarly prefers compliance (in the absence of threatened violation detection). Blue's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over three different Red types: Violators, Compilers, and Deterrables. Criteria are derived to determine the level at which Blue should set his detection threshold, and when it is best for Blue not to verify at all. The results involve both game-theoretic and Bayes solutions. 9 refs., 14 figs.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE; USDOE, Washington, DC (USA)
OSTI Identifier:
6073758
Report Number(s):
UCRL-JC-105885; CONF-9106112-1
ON: DE91007148
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: International conference on game theory, Florence (Italy), 25-27 Jun 1991
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE; ARMS CONTROL; STATISTICAL MODELS; TREATIES; VERIFICATION; COMPLIANCE; DECISION MAKING; DECISION TREE ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MATHEMATICS; STATISTICS; 350101* - Arms Control- Policy, Negotiations, & Legislation- Treaties- (1987-); 350300 - Arms Control- Verification- (1987-); 990200 - Mathematics & Computers

Citation Formats

Weissenberger, S. Treaty verification with an uncertain partner. United States: N. p., 1991. Web.
Weissenberger, S. Treaty verification with an uncertain partner. United States.
Weissenberger, S. Tue . "Treaty verification with an uncertain partner". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6073758.
@article{osti_6073758,
title = {Treaty verification with an uncertain partner},
author = {Weissenberger, S.},
abstractNote = {A simple model is used to analyze the performance of a system for verifying compliance with an arms control treaty. Blue and Red are partners in to a treaty. Blue prefers to comply, but is uncertain whether Red similarly prefers compliance (in the absence of threatened violation detection). Blue's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over three different Red types: Violators, Compilers, and Deterrables. Criteria are derived to determine the level at which Blue should set his detection threshold, and when it is best for Blue not to verify at all. The results involve both game-theoretic and Bayes solutions. 9 refs., 14 figs.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991},
month = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991}
}

Conference:
Other availability
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