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Title: Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

Abstract

The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Richland, WA (USA)
OSTI Identifier:
5915751
Report Number(s):
PNL-2549(Supp.)
TRN: 79-019815
DOE Contract Number:
EY-76-C-06-1830
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 42 ENGINEERING; BATTELLE PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORIES; SAFETY STANDARDS; CONTROL; DESIGN; EQUIPMENT; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS HANDLING; OPERATION; PERSONNEL; RADIATION PROTECTION; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; STANDARDS; US DOE; US ERDA; US ORGANIZATIONS; 054000* - Nuclear Fuels- Health & Safety; 420600 - Engineering- Safety Engineering- (-1987)

Citation Formats

Richey, C.R. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement. United States: N. p., 1979. Web. doi:10.2172/5915751.
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Richey, C.R. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement. United States. doi:10.2172/5915751.
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Richey, C.R. Wed . "Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement". United States. doi:10.2172/5915751. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5915751.
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@article{osti_5915751,
title = {Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement},
author = {Richey, C.R.},
abstractNote = {The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures.},
doi = {10.2172/5915751},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 1979},
month = {Wed Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 1979}
}
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Technical Report:
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DOI:  10.2172/5915751
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