Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata

Murphey, W; Emeigh, C; Lessler, L

Title: Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata

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Abstract

Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) is a concept which is to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (Agency) to make technically valid statements of verification of shipment or receipt strata when the Agency cannot have a resident inspector. Gordon and Sanborn addressed this problem for a centrifuge enrichment plant. In this paper other operating conditions of interest are examined and modifications of the necessary conditions for application of SNRI discussed.

Authors:

Murphey, W; Emeigh, C; Lessler, L ^[1]

International Safeguards Branch, USNRC, Rockville, MD (US)

Publication Date:: Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991

OSTI Identifier:: 5592838

Report Number(s):: CONF-910774-
Journal ID: ISSN 0362-0034; CODEN: NUMMB

Resource Type:: Conference

Journal Name:: Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States)

Additional Journal Information:: Journal Volume: 20; Conference: 32. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting, New Orleans, LA (United States), 28-31 Jul 1991; Journal ID: ISSN 0362-0034

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS; INSPECTION; IAEA; OPERATION; RANDOMNESS; VERIFICATION; INDUSTRIAL PLANTS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 055000* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability; 050500 - Nuclear Fuels- Uranium Enrichment

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                    Murphey, W, Emeigh, C, and Lessler, L. Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata.  United States: N. p., 1991. 
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                    Murphey, W, Emeigh, C, & Lessler, L. Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata.  United States.

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                    Murphey, W, Emeigh, C, and Lessler, L. 1991.  
        "Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata".  United States.

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@article{osti_5592838,

  title        = {Some remarks relating to Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) and verification of flow strata},

  author       = {Murphey, W and Emeigh, C and Lessler, L},

  abstractNote = {Short Notice Random Inspection (SNRI) is a concept which is to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (Agency) to make technically valid statements of verification of shipment or receipt strata when the Agency cannot have a resident inspector. Gordon and Sanborn addressed this problem for a centrifuge enrichment plant. In this paper other operating conditions of interest are examined and modifications of the necessary conditions for application of SNRI discussed.},

  doi          = {},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5592838},
  journal      = {Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States)},

  issn         = {0362-0034},

  number       = ,

  volume       = 20,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991},

  month        = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991}

}

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