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Title: Nuclear security

Abstract

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, located in Livermore, California, generates and controls large numbers of classified documents associated with the research and testing of nuclear weapons. Concern has been raised about the potential for espionage at the laboratory and the national security implications of classified documents being stolen. This paper determines the extent of missing classified documents at the laboratory and assesses the adequacy of accountability over classified documents in the laboratory's custody. Audit coverage was limited to the approximately 600,000 secret documents in the laboratory's custody. The adequacy of DOE's oversight of the laboratory's secret document control program was also assessed.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
General Accounting Office, Washington, DC (United States). Resources, Community and Economic Development Div.
OSTI Identifier:
5503723
Report Number(s):
GAO/RCED-91-65
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE; LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY; SECURITY VIOLATIONS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; INFORMATION; AUDITS; CALIFORNIA; NATIONAL SECURITY; TESTING; US DOE; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; NORTH AMERICA; SECURITY; US AEC; US ERDA; US ORGANIZATIONS; USA; VIOLATIONS; WEAPONS 990100* -- Management

Citation Formats

Dingell, J.D. Nuclear security. United States: N. p., 1991. Web.
Dingell, J.D. Nuclear security. United States.
Dingell, J.D. 1991. "Nuclear security". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_5503723,
title = {Nuclear security},
author = {Dingell, J.D.},
abstractNote = {The Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, located in Livermore, California, generates and controls large numbers of classified documents associated with the research and testing of nuclear weapons. Concern has been raised about the potential for espionage at the laboratory and the national security implications of classified documents being stolen. This paper determines the extent of missing classified documents at the laboratory and assesses the adequacy of accountability over classified documents in the laboratory's custody. Audit coverage was limited to the approximately 600,000 secret documents in the laboratory's custody. The adequacy of DOE's oversight of the laboratory's secret document control program was also assessed.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 1991,
month = 2
}

Technical Report:
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