Site-specific emergency response concept plans for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
Abstract
Site-specific emergency response concept plans were developed to help initiate enhanced emergency preparedness for continued storage of the stockpile and the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) at the eight army installations storing the unitary chemical stockpile -- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Anniston Army Depot, Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pueblo Depot Activity, Tooele Army Depot, and Umatilla Depot Activity. This document summarizes the emergency response plans for all the sites and highlights similarities and differences among them. Section 2 summarizes site-specific differences in stockpile hazard and risk by showing differences in planning-basis accident categories and distributions of topographical features, meteorological conditions, and populations at risk. Section 3 presents a summary of the methodology used to identify the emergency planning zones for each site and the actual recommended boundaries of those zones for the eight sites. Section 4 identifies feasible and recommended protective actions for the sites and explains reasons for differences in them. Finally, Section 5 notes the dependence of protective action effectiveness on the development and implementation of command and control and warning systems that can be implemented in a timely manner, it also identifies the differences in recommended lead times (i.e., from themore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (USA)
- Sponsoring Org.:
- DOE/DP
- OSTI Identifier:
- 5106213
- Report Number(s):
- ORNL/TM-11357
ON: DE90005305
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-84OR21400
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVES; RISK ASSESSMENT; CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS; STOCKPILES; STORAGE FACILITIES; EMERGENCY PLANS; ACCIDENTS; COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; CONVENTIONAL WARFARE; DECISION MAKING; FEASIBILITY STUDIES; HEALTH HAZARDS; MAPPING; MEASURING METHODS; MITIGATION; NATIONAL DEFENSE; PLANNING; PROGRAM MANAGEMENT; PUBLIC HEALTH; RECOMMENDATIONS; SITE CHARACTERIZATION; TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT; TOPOGRAPHY; EXPLOSIVES; HAZARDS; MANAGEMENT; WARFARE; WEAPONS; 450100* - Military Technology, Weaponry, & National Defense- Chemical Explosions & Explosives
Citation Formats
Carnes, S A. Site-specific emergency response concept plans for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. United States: N. p., 1989.
Web.
Carnes, S A. Site-specific emergency response concept plans for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. United States.
Carnes, S A. 1989.
"Site-specific emergency response concept plans for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program". United States.
@article{osti_5106213,
title = {Site-specific emergency response concept plans for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program},
author = {Carnes, S A},
abstractNote = {Site-specific emergency response concept plans were developed to help initiate enhanced emergency preparedness for continued storage of the stockpile and the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) at the eight army installations storing the unitary chemical stockpile -- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Anniston Army Depot, Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pueblo Depot Activity, Tooele Army Depot, and Umatilla Depot Activity. This document summarizes the emergency response plans for all the sites and highlights similarities and differences among them. Section 2 summarizes site-specific differences in stockpile hazard and risk by showing differences in planning-basis accident categories and distributions of topographical features, meteorological conditions, and populations at risk. Section 3 presents a summary of the methodology used to identify the emergency planning zones for each site and the actual recommended boundaries of those zones for the eight sites. Section 4 identifies feasible and recommended protective actions for the sites and explains reasons for differences in them. Finally, Section 5 notes the dependence of protective action effectiveness on the development and implementation of command and control and warning systems that can be implemented in a timely manner, it also identifies the differences in recommended lead times (i.e., from the onset of an accidental release) needed at the sites for effective implementation of protective actions. 17 refs., 11 figs. , 12 tabs.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5106213},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Dec 01 00:00:00 EST 1989},
month = {Fri Dec 01 00:00:00 EST 1989}
}