Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report

doi:https://doi.org/10.2172/437625

Title: Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report

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Abstract

This report is the product of a four-month independent technical assessment of potential proliferation vulnerabilities associated with the plutonium disposition alternatives currently under review by DOE/MD. The scope of this MD-chartered/Sandia-led study was limited to technical considerations that could reduce proliferation resistance during various stages of the disposition processes below the Stored Weapon/Spent Fuel standards. Both overt and covert threats from host nation and unauthorized parties were considered. The results of this study will be integrated with complementary work by others into an overall Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment in support of a Secretarial Record of Decision later this year for disposition of surplus U.S. weapons plutonium.

Authors:

Hinton, J P; Barnard, R W; Bennett, D E ^[1]

and others

Publication Date:: 1996-10-01

Research Org.:: Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC (United States)

OSTI Identifier:: 437625

Report Number(s):: SAND-97-8203
ON: DE97050519

DOE Contract Number:: AC04-94AL85000

Resource Type:: Technical Report

Resource Relation:: Other Information: PBD: Oct 1996

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 35 ARMS CONTROL; 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; VULNERABILITY; PLUTONIUM; RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL; ARMS CONTROL; FISSILE MATERIALS; USA; RADIATION PROTECTION; RADIATION DOSES

Citation Formats


                    Hinton, J P, Barnard, R W, and Bennett, D E. Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report.  United States: N. p., 1996. 
        Web.  doi:10.2172/437625.

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                    Hinton, J P, Barnard, R W, & Bennett, D E. Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.2172/437625

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                    Hinton, J P, Barnard, R W, and Bennett, D E. Tue .  
        "Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.2172/437625.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/437625.

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@article{osti_437625,

  title        = {Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team report},

  author       = {Hinton, J P and Barnard, R W and Bennett, D E},

  abstractNote = {This report is the product of a four-month independent technical assessment of potential proliferation vulnerabilities associated with the plutonium disposition alternatives currently under review by DOE/MD. The scope of this MD-chartered/Sandia-led study was limited to technical considerations that could reduce proliferation resistance during various stages of the disposition processes below the Stored Weapon/Spent Fuel standards. Both overt and covert threats from host nation and unauthorized parties were considered. The results of this study will be integrated with complementary work by others into an overall Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment in support of a Secretarial Record of Decision later this year for disposition of surplus U.S. weapons plutonium.},

  doi          = {10.2172/437625},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/437625},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {1996},

  month        = {10}

}

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Technical Report:

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