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Title: False alarm probabilities for mixed events

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Teledyne Geotech, Alexandria, Va. (USA)
OSTI Identifier:
4284000
Report Number(s):
AD-775635/6; SDAC-TR-73-8
NSA Number:
NSA-30-023929
DOE Contract Number:
F08606-74-C-0006
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Orig. Receipt Date: 31-DEC-74
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
N42510* -Engineering-Nuclear Explosions-Detection Systems; *EARTHQUAKES- SEISMIC DETECTION; *NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DETECTION- SEISMIC WAVES

Citation Formats

Cohen, T.J., and Sweetser, E.I. False alarm probabilities for mixed events. United States: N. p., 1973. Web.
Cohen, T.J., & Sweetser, E.I. False alarm probabilities for mixed events. United States.
Cohen, T.J., and Sweetser, E.I. Thu . "False alarm probabilities for mixed events". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_4284000,
title = {False alarm probabilities for mixed events},
author = {Cohen, T.J. and Sweetser, E.I.},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Nov 01 00:00:00 EST 1973},
month = {Thu Nov 01 00:00:00 EST 1973}
}

Technical Report:
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