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Title: Risk and cost tradeoffs for remote retrieval of buried waste

Abstract

The Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration is supporting the development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation of a suite of technologies that, when integrated with commercially available technologies, form a comprehensive system for the remediation of radioactive and hazardous buried waste. As a part of the program`s technology development, remote retrieval equipment is being developed and tested for the remediation of buried waste. During remedial planning, several factors are considered when choosing remote versus manual retrieval systems. Time that workers are exposed to radioactivity, chemicals, air particulate, and industrial hazards is one consideration. The generation of secondary waste is also a consideration because it amounts to more waste to treat and some wastes may require special handling or treatment. Cost is also a big factor in determining whether remote or manual operations will be used. Other considerations include implementability, effectiveness, and the number of required personnel. This paper investigates each of these areas to show the risk and cost benefits and limitations for remote versus manual retrieval of buried waste.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lockheed Idaho Technologies Co., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
34314
Report Number(s):
INEL-94/00045; CONF-941214-2
ON: DE95008606; TRN: 95:008967
DOE Contract Number:
AC07-94ID13223
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 16. US Department of Energy low-level radioactive waste management conference, Phoenix, AZ (United States), 13-15 Dec 1994; Other Information: PBD: [1994]
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; STORAGE FACILITIES; WASTE RETRIEVAL; REMEDIAL ACTION; RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS; OPERATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; CONTACT HANDLING; REMOTE HANDLING; UNDERGROUND STORAGE; RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

Citation Formats

Hyde, R.A., Grienbenow, B.E., and Nickelson, D.F. Risk and cost tradeoffs for remote retrieval of buried waste. United States: N. p., 1994. Web.
Hyde, R.A., Grienbenow, B.E., & Nickelson, D.F. Risk and cost tradeoffs for remote retrieval of buried waste. United States.
Hyde, R.A., Grienbenow, B.E., and Nickelson, D.F. Sat . "Risk and cost tradeoffs for remote retrieval of buried waste". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/34314.
@article{osti_34314,
title = {Risk and cost tradeoffs for remote retrieval of buried waste},
author = {Hyde, R.A. and Grienbenow, B.E. and Nickelson, D.F.},
abstractNote = {The Buried Waste Integrated Demonstration is supporting the development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation of a suite of technologies that, when integrated with commercially available technologies, form a comprehensive system for the remediation of radioactive and hazardous buried waste. As a part of the program`s technology development, remote retrieval equipment is being developed and tested for the remediation of buried waste. During remedial planning, several factors are considered when choosing remote versus manual retrieval systems. Time that workers are exposed to radioactivity, chemicals, air particulate, and industrial hazards is one consideration. The generation of secondary waste is also a consideration because it amounts to more waste to treat and some wastes may require special handling or treatment. Cost is also a big factor in determining whether remote or manual operations will be used. Other considerations include implementability, effectiveness, and the number of required personnel. This paper investigates each of these areas to show the risk and cost benefits and limitations for remote versus manual retrieval of buried waste.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 1994},
month = {Sat Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 1994}
}

Conference:
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  • The DOE is evaluating what should be done with this buried waste. Although the radioactive waste is not particularly mobile unless airborne, some of it was buried with volatile organics and/or other substances that tend to spread easily to surrounding soil or water tables. Volatile organics are hazardous materials (such as trichloroethylene) and require clean-up at certain levels in drinking water. There is concern that the buried volatile organics will spread into the water table and contaminate drinking water. Because of this, the DOE is considering options for handling this buried waste and reducing the risks of spreading or exposure.more » There are two primary options: containment and stabilization, or retrieval. Containment and stabilization systems would include systems that would leave the waste where it is, but contain and stabilize it so that the radioactive and hazardous materials would not spread to the surrounding soil, water, or air. For example, an in situ vitrification system could be used to melt the waste into a composite glass-like material that would not leach into the surrounding soil, water, or air. Retrieval systems are those that would remove the waste from its burial location for treatment and/or repackaging for long term storage. The objective of this project was to develop and demonstrate remote technologies that would minimize dust generation and the spread of airborne contaminants during buried waste retrieval. Remote technologies are essential for the retrieval of buried waste because they remove workers from the hazardous environment and provide greater automation, reducing the chances of human error. Minimizing dust generation is also essential to increased safety for the workers and the environment during buried waste retrieval. The main contaminants within the waste are micron-sized particles of plutonium and americium oxides, chlorides, and hydroxides, which are easily suspended in air and spread if disturbed.« less
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