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Title: Authorization basis supporting documentation for plutonium finishing plant

Abstract

The identification and definition of the authorization basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility and operations are essential for compliance to DOE Order 5480.21, Unreviewed Safety Questions. The authorization basis, as defined in the Order, consists of those aspects of the facility design basis, i.e., the structures, systems and components (SSCS) and the operational requirements that are considered to be important to the safety of operations and are relied upon by DOE to authorize operation of the facility. These facility design features and their function in various accident scenarios are described in WHC-SD-CP-SAR-021, Plutonium Finishing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 9, `Accident Analysis.` Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the Authorization Basis to its components and other information contained in safety documentation supporting the Authorization Basis. The PFP SSCs that are important to safety, collectively referred to as the `Safety Envelope` are discussed in various chapters of the FSAR and in WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010, Plutonium Finishing Plant Operational Safety Requirements. Other documents such as Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSERS) address and support some portions of the Authorization Basis and Safety Envelope.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
325375
Report Number(s):
HNF-SD-CP-SDD-014-Rev.2
ON: DE98059647; BR: EW7002010; TRN: 97000164
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 5 Mar 1997
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; SAFETY; PLUTONIUM; PRODUCTION; RISK ASSESSMENT; ACCIDENTS

Citation Formats

King, J.P., Fluor Daniel Hanford. Authorization basis supporting documentation for plutonium finishing plant. United States: N. p., 1997. Web. doi:10.2172/325375.
King, J.P., Fluor Daniel Hanford. Authorization basis supporting documentation for plutonium finishing plant. United States. doi:10.2172/325375.
King, J.P., Fluor Daniel Hanford. Wed . "Authorization basis supporting documentation for plutonium finishing plant". United States. doi:10.2172/325375. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/325375.
@article{osti_325375,
title = {Authorization basis supporting documentation for plutonium finishing plant},
author = {King, J.P., Fluor Daniel Hanford},
abstractNote = {The identification and definition of the authorization basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility and operations are essential for compliance to DOE Order 5480.21, Unreviewed Safety Questions. The authorization basis, as defined in the Order, consists of those aspects of the facility design basis, i.e., the structures, systems and components (SSCS) and the operational requirements that are considered to be important to the safety of operations and are relied upon by DOE to authorize operation of the facility. These facility design features and their function in various accident scenarios are described in WHC-SD-CP-SAR-021, Plutonium Finishing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 9, `Accident Analysis.` Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the Authorization Basis to its components and other information contained in safety documentation supporting the Authorization Basis. The PFP SSCs that are important to safety, collectively referred to as the `Safety Envelope` are discussed in various chapters of the FSAR and in WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010, Plutonium Finishing Plant Operational Safety Requirements. Other documents such as Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSERS) address and support some portions of the Authorization Basis and Safety Envelope.},
doi = {10.2172/325375},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 05 00:00:00 EST 1997},
month = {Wed Mar 05 00:00:00 EST 1997}
}

Technical Report:

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  • The document identifies the source term for PFP and documents the requirements providing the basis for the internal bioassay monitoring for routine work within the facility. It is also intended to identify the need for specific planning for internal dosimetry for work that does not fall within the normal radiological conditions in regard to isotopic ratios normally encountered.
  • In the summer of 1998, Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) project prepared to restart its thermal stabilization process after 1(1/2)-yr suspension in operations. The facility had overcome a number of operational and safety problems, yet it had been unable to achieve appropriate update, approval, and implementation of an appropriate, current authorization basis. This problem threatened to prevent a timely restart, which, in turn, could have caused a loss in momentum and dampened enthusiasm within the facility. The authors describe the approach taken by B and W Hanford Company (BWHC) in conjunction with its partners, the US Department of Energy (DOE)more » Richland Operations Office and Fluor Daniel Hanford Company (FDH), to establish a defensible authorization basis, which allowed the facility to resume its mission of stabilizing reactive plutonium materials. The approach incorporates methods used within the DOE complex for short-term activities and those undergoing deactivation and implements principles of integrated safety management (ISM), as described in ``Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board [(DNFSB)] Recommendation 95-2'' and related documents.« less
  • Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is proposing to construct a biosafety level (BSL-3) facility at Site 200 in Livermore, California. Biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) is a designation assigned by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes Health (NIH) for handling infectious organisms based on the specific microorganisms and associated operations. Biosafety levels range from BSL-1 (lowest hazard) to BSL-4 (highest hazard). Details about the BSL-3 criteria are described in the Center of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/National Institutes of Health (NIH)'s publication ''Biosafety Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories'' (BMBL), 4th edition (CDC 1999): The BSL-3 facility willmore » be built in accordance with the required BMBL guidelines. This Preliminary Authorization Basis Documentation (PABD) for the proposed BSL-3 facility has been prepared in accordance with the current contractual requirements at LLNL. This includes the LLNL Environment, Safety, and Health Manual (ES&H Manual) and applicable Work Smart Standards, including the biosafety standards, such as the aforementioned BMBL and the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules: The proposed BSL-3 facility is a 1,100 ft{sup 2}, one-story permanent prefabricated facility, which will have three individual BSL-3 laboratory rooms (one of which is an animal biosafety level-3 [ABSL-3] laboratory to handle rodents), a mechanical room, clothes-change and shower rooms, and small storage space (Figure 3.1). The BSL-3 facility will be designed and operated accordance with guidelines for BSL-3 laboratories established by the CDC and the NIH. No radiological, high explosives, fissile, or propellant material will be used or stored in the proposed BSL-3 facility. The BSL-3 facility will be used to develop scientific tools to identify and understand the pathogens of medical, environmental, and forensic importance. Microorganisms that are to be handled in this facility will be limited in quantity, type and form in accordance with the BMBL requirements and approval by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC). The proposed facility will have the unique capability within DOE/NNSA to perform aerosol studies to include challenges to rodents using infectious agents or biologically derived toxins (biotoxins). These types of aerosol studies will be strictly confined in a Class II Type B biosafety cabinet.« less
  • This document establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) work place air monitoring program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 835 ''Occupational Radiation Protection''; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1); HNF-PRO-33 1, Work Place Air Monitoring; WHC-SD-CP-SAR-021, Plutonium Finishing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report; and Applicable recognized national standards invoked by DOE Orders and Policies.