Nuclear criticality project plan for the Hanford Site tank farms
The mission of this project is to provide a defensible technical basis report in support of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This technical basis report will also be used to resolve technical issues associated with the nuclear criticality safety issue. The strategy presented in this project plan includes an integrated programmatic and organizational approach. The scope of this project plan includes the provision of a criticality technical basis supporting document (CTBSD) to support the FSAR as well as for resolution of the nuclear criticality safety issue. Specifically, the CTBSD provides the requisite technical analysis to support the FSAR hazard and accident analysis as well as for the determination of the required FSAR limits and controls. The scope of The CTBSD will provide a baseline for understanding waste partitioning and distribution phenomena and mechanistics for current operational activities inclusive of single-shell tanks, double-shell tanks, double-contained receiver tanks, and miscellaneous underground storage tanks.. Although the FSAR does not include future operational activities, the waste partitioning and distribution phenomena and mechanistics work scope identified in this project plan provide a sound technical basis as a point of departure to support independent safety analyses for future activities. The CTBSD also provides the technical basis for resolution of the technical issues associated with the nuclear criticality safety issue. In addition to the CTBSD, additional documentation will be required to fully resolve U.S. Department of Energy-Headquarters administrative and programmatic issues. The strategy and activities defined in this project plan provide a CTBSD for the FSAR and for accelerated resolution of the safety issue in FY 1996. On April 30, 1992, a plant review committee reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Reports for the single-shell, double-shell, and aging waste tanks in light of the conclusions of the inadequate waste characterization with respect to fissile material. The review indicated that the conclusion in the FSARS, that a criticality is not credible, cannot be supported for a full range of potential tank constituents. Therefore, a USQ was declared. Development of a credible scenario leading to a criticality proved to be extremely difficult, given the paucity of data on the quantity and distribution of fissile material in the tanks. The objective of this project plan is to develop a strategy and technical approach to provide a CTBSD for the FSAR and for resolution of the nuclear criticality safety issue pertaining to tank farm waste storage and transfer operations. The strategy and technical approach identified in this project plan include definition of administrative and technical tasks. Technical analyses will include mechanistic studies, historical data review, and additional limited neutronics analysis. Completion of these studies will be documented in a CTBSD to support the existing criticality technical basis. The CTBSD will be incorporated in the criticality portion of the FSAR.
- Research Organization:
- Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-96RL13200
- OSTI ID:
- 325286
- Report Number(s):
- WHC-EP-0902; ON: DE98058059; BR: EW3120071; TRN: 96000663
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 6 Aug 1996
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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