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Title: Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology

Abstract

The succession of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 has changed the nature of their missile rivalry, which is only one of numerous manifestations of their relationship as hardened adversaries, deeply sensitive to each other's existing and evolving defense capabilities. The political context surrounding this costly rivalry remains unmediated by arms control measures or by any nascent prospect of detente. As a parallel development, sensible voices in both countries will continue to talk of building mutual confidence through openness to avert accidents, misjudgments, and misinterpretations. To facilitate a future peace process, this paper offers possible suggestions for stabilization that could be applied to India's and Pakistan's missile situation. Appendices include descriptions of existing missile agreements that have contributed to better relations for other countries as well as a list of the cooperative monitoring technologies available to provide information useful in implementing subcontinent missile regimes.

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
2407
Report Number(s):
SAND98-0505/4
ON: DE00002407
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
35 ARMS CONTROL; India; Pakistan; Arms Control; International Agreements; Monitoring

Citation Formats

Kamal, N., and Sawhney, P.. Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology. United States: N. p., 1998. Web. doi:10.2172/2407.
Kamal, N., & Sawhney, P.. Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology. United States. doi:10.2172/2407.
Kamal, N., and Sawhney, P.. 1998. "Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology". United States. doi:10.2172/2407. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/2407.
@article{osti_2407,
title = {Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology},
author = {Kamal, N. and Sawhney, P.},
abstractNote = {The succession of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 has changed the nature of their missile rivalry, which is only one of numerous manifestations of their relationship as hardened adversaries, deeply sensitive to each other's existing and evolving defense capabilities. The political context surrounding this costly rivalry remains unmediated by arms control measures or by any nascent prospect of detente. As a parallel development, sensible voices in both countries will continue to talk of building mutual confidence through openness to avert accidents, misjudgments, and misinterpretations. To facilitate a future peace process, this paper offers possible suggestions for stabilization that could be applied to India's and Pakistan's missile situation. Appendices include descriptions of existing missile agreements that have contributed to better relations for other countries as well as a list of the cooperative monitoring technologies available to provide information useful in implementing subcontinent missile regimes.},
doi = {10.2172/2407},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 1998,
month =
}

Technical Report:

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  • The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 triggered a full-blown nuclear debate. For the first time, hard-liners, moderates, and pacifists engaged in an extensive public discussion that helped to make the people of Pakistan more sensitive to the dangers of nuclear competition. Pakistan's concerns about its conventional military inferiority, both in the present and future, and the belief that nuclear capability would deter India from exerting its superior military strength, constituted the bedrock of its perception on the nuclear issue. Ofilcial Pakistani statements, both immediately after the nuclear tests and later, have advocated restraint on the issue ofmore » nuclearization, indicating cognizance of the importance of avoiding a regional nuclear arms competition, both for security and economic reasons. This paper suggests a variety of nonweaponization and nondeployment options that would serve the security interests of India and Pakistan. Besides preventing a hair-trigger situation, these options could reduce the financial and logistical burden of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons as well as lower strategic threat-perceptions.« less
  • Several existing nuclear-related agreements already require India and Pakistan, as members, to share information. The agreements are bilateral, regional, and international. Greater nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan could be promoted by first understanding the information flows required by existing agreements. This understanding is an essential step for developing projects that can incrementally advance the sensitivity of the information being shared. This paper provides a survey of existing nuclear-related agreements involving India and Pakistan, and suggests future confidence-building projects using the frameworks provided by these agreements. The Bilateral Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Facilitiesmore » is discussed as a basis for creating further agreements on restricting the use and deployment of nuclear weapons. The author suggests options for enhancing the value of the list of nuclear facilities exchanged annually as a part of this agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency's regional cooperation agreement among countries in the Asia-Pacific region is an opportunity for greater subregional nuclear cooperation in South Asia. Linking the regional agreement with South Asian environmental cooperation and marine pollution protection efforts could provide a framework for projects involving Indian and Pakistani coastal nuclear facilities. Programs of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations that use nuclear techniques to increase food and crop production and optimize water management in arid areas also provide similar opportunities for nuclear cooperation. Other frameworks for nuclear cooperation originate from international conventions related to nuclear safety, transportation of nuclear wastes, worker protection against ionizing radiation, and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons in certain areas. The information shared by existing frameworks includes: laws and regulations (including internal inspection procedures that enforce compliance); lists of nuclear facilities; emergency response procedures and available resources; information related to the transportation of nuclear wastes (particularly via shipping); understanding and notification of accidental releases; and radionuclide release data from select coastal facilities. Incremental increases in the sensitivity of the information being shared could strengthen norms for Indian and Pakistani nuclear transparency. This paper suggests seven technology-based Indian and Pakistani nuclear transparency projects for consideration. Existing nuclear-related agreements provide an information-sharing framework within which the projects could occur. Eventually, as confidence increases and new agreements are negotiated, future projects could begin to deal with the accounting of fissile materials and nuclear weapons disposition and control.« less
  • No abstract prepared.
  • The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied tomore » the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.« less