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Title: SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment

Abstract

Purpose: To evaluate the differences between the Veteran Affairs Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and the AAPM Task Group 100 Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment techniques in the setting of a stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) procedure were compared respectively. Understanding the differences in the techniques methodologies and outcomes will provide further insight into the applicability and utility of risk assessments exercises in radiation therapy. Methods: HFMEA risk assessment analysis was performed on a stereotactic radiosurgery procedure. A previous study from our institution completed a FMEA of our SRS procedure and the process map generated from this work was used for the HFMEA. The process of performing the HFMEA scoring was analyzed, and the results from both analyses were compared. Results: The key differences between the two risk assessments are the scoring criteria for failure modes and identifying critical failure modes for potential hazards. The general consensus among the team performing the analyses was that scoring for the HFMEA was simpler and more intuitive then the FMEA. The FMEA identified 25 critical failure modes while the HFMEA identified 39. Seven of the FMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the HFMEA and 21 of the HFMEA criticalmore » failure modes were not identified by the FMEA. HFMEA as described by the Veteran Affairs provides guidelines on which failure modes to address first. Conclusion: HFMEA is a more efficient model for identifying gross risks in a process than FMEA. Clinics with minimal staff, time and resources can benefit from this type of risk assessment to eliminate or mitigate high risk hazards with nominal effort. FMEA can provide more in depth details but at the cost of elevated effort.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [2]; ; ;  [3]
  1. Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR (United States)
  2. (United States)
  3. University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA (United States)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
22648862
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Medical Physics; Journal Volume: 43; Journal Issue: 6; Other Information: (c) 2016 American Association of Physicists in Medicine; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES; 61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY; HAZARDS; PUBLIC HEALTH; RADIOTHERAPY; RISK ASSESSMENT

Citation Formats

Harry, T, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, Manger, R, Cervino, L, and Pawlicki, T. SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment. United States: N. p., 2016. Web. doi:10.1118/1.4956386.
Harry, T, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, Manger, R, Cervino, L, & Pawlicki, T. SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment. United States. doi:10.1118/1.4956386.
Harry, T, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, Manger, R, Cervino, L, and Pawlicki, T. Wed . "SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment". United States. doi:10.1118/1.4956386.
@article{osti_22648862,
title = {SU-F-T-246: Evaluation of Healthcare Failure Mode And Effect Analysis For Risk Assessment},
author = {Harry, T and University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA and Manger, R and Cervino, L and Pawlicki, T},
abstractNote = {Purpose: To evaluate the differences between the Veteran Affairs Healthcare Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and the AAPM Task Group 100 Failure and Effect Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment techniques in the setting of a stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) procedure were compared respectively. Understanding the differences in the techniques methodologies and outcomes will provide further insight into the applicability and utility of risk assessments exercises in radiation therapy. Methods: HFMEA risk assessment analysis was performed on a stereotactic radiosurgery procedure. A previous study from our institution completed a FMEA of our SRS procedure and the process map generated from this work was used for the HFMEA. The process of performing the HFMEA scoring was analyzed, and the results from both analyses were compared. Results: The key differences between the two risk assessments are the scoring criteria for failure modes and identifying critical failure modes for potential hazards. The general consensus among the team performing the analyses was that scoring for the HFMEA was simpler and more intuitive then the FMEA. The FMEA identified 25 critical failure modes while the HFMEA identified 39. Seven of the FMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the HFMEA and 21 of the HFMEA critical failure modes were not identified by the FMEA. HFMEA as described by the Veteran Affairs provides guidelines on which failure modes to address first. Conclusion: HFMEA is a more efficient model for identifying gross risks in a process than FMEA. Clinics with minimal staff, time and resources can benefit from this type of risk assessment to eliminate or mitigate high risk hazards with nominal effort. FMEA can provide more in depth details but at the cost of elevated effort.},
doi = {10.1118/1.4956386},
journal = {Medical Physics},
number = 6,
volume = 43,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Jun 15 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Wed Jun 15 00:00:00 EDT 2016}
}
  • Purpose: To optimize the clinical processes of radiotherapy and to reduce the radiotherapy risks by implementing the powerful risk management tools of failure mode and effects analysis(FMEA) and PDCA(plan-do-check-act). Methods: A multidiciplinary QA(Quality Assurance) team from our department consisting of oncologists, physicists, dosimetrists, therapists and administrator was established and an entire workflow QA process management using FMEA and PDCA tools was implemented for the whole treatment process. After the primary process tree was created, the failure modes and Risk priority numbers(RPNs) were determined by each member, and then the RPNs were averaged after team discussion. Results: 3 of 9 failuremore » modes with RPN above 100 in the practice were identified in the first PDCA cycle, which were further analyzed to investigate the RPNs: including of patient registration error, prescription error and treating wrong patient. New process controls reduced the occurrence, or detectability scores from the top 3 failure modes. Two important corrective actions reduced the highest RPNs from 300 to 50, and the error rate of radiotherapy decreased remarkably. Conclusion: FMEA and PDCA are helpful in identifying potential problems in the radiotherapy process, which was proven to improve the safety, quality and efficiency of radiation therapy in our department. The implementation of the FMEA approach may improve the understanding of the overall process of radiotherapy while may identify potential flaws in the whole process. Further more, repeating the PDCA cycle can bring us closer to the goal: higher safety and accuracy radiotherapy.« less
  • Purpose: The goal of the present work was to evaluate the process maps for stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) treatment at three radiotherapy centers in Brazil and apply the FMEA technique to evaluate similarities and differences, if any, of the hazards and risks associated with these processes. Methods: A team, consisting of professionals from different disciplines and involved in the SRS treatment, was formed at each center. Each team was responsible for the development of the process map, and performance of FMEA and FTA. A facilitator knowledgeable in these techniques led the work at each center. The TG100 recommended scales were usedmore » for the evaluation of hazard and severity for each step for the major process “treatment planning”. Results: Hazard index given by the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is found to range from 4–270 for various processes and the severity (S) index is found to range from 1–10. The RPN values > 100 and severity value ≥ 7 were chosen to flag safety improvement interventions. Number of steps with RPN ≥100 were found to be 6, 59 and 45 for the three centers. The corresponding values for S ≥ 7 are 24, 21 and 25 respectively. The range of RPN and S values for each center belong to different process steps and failure modes. Conclusion: These results show that interventions to improve safety is different for each center and it is associated with the skill level of the professional team as well as the technology used to provide radiosurgery treatment. The present study will very likely be a model for implementation of risk-based prospective quality management program for SRS treatment in Brazil where currently there are 28 radiotherapy centers performing SRS. A complete FMEA for SRS for these three radiotherapy centers is currently under development.« less
  • Purpose: To evaluate the curative effect of radio (chemo) therapy and mode of treatment failure in no-metastasis and lesion length ≤ 5.0cm esophageal squamous cell carcinoma (ESCC). Methods: There were 158 eligible patients were retrospectively analyzed, to analysis the curative effect of radio (chemo) therapy, prognosis factors, toxicity and prognostic index model. Results: To all patients the 1, 3, 5 overall survival rate were 83.54%, 52.53%, 32.58%, the local recurrence rate were 15.08%, 33.60% and 38.14%; distant metastasis rate were 10.64%, 25.21% and 36.06%; tumor specific survival rate were 76.64%, 54.07% and 44.51%. Multivariate analysis showed that patients with ECOGmore » grade (χ2=13.945, P=0.000), short-term effect (χ2=19.360, P=0.000) and different radiotherapy methods (χ2=9.866, P=0.002) as the independent prognostic factors. Prognostic index model showed that the survival rate was significantly higher in the lower value of PI group than in the larger value of PI group (χ2=49.19, P=0.0000). In our whole group, there were simple locoregional recurrence (LR) 40 cases (25.3%), simple Distant metastasis (DM) 31 cases (19.6%), LR and DM in 14 cases (8.9%) after treatment. The chi-square test showed that there were no significant difference in the incidence of Elective Nodal Irradiation (ENI )and Involved Field Irradiation (IFI) patients with LR and DM ( χ2=2.363, 2.950, P=0.124, 0.085). Conclusion: Radio (chemo) therapy has a good curative effect in no-metastasis and lesion length ≤ 5.0cm ESCC patients.« less
  • Purpose: Functional radiosurgery has been used successfully in the treatment of trigeminal neuralgia but presents significant challenges to ensuring the high prescription dose is delivered accurately. A review of existing practice should help direct the focus of quality improvement for this treatment regime. Method: Failure modes and effects analysis was used to identify the processes in preparing radiosurgery treatment for TN. The map was developed by a multidisciplinary team including: neurosurgeon, radiation oncology, physicist and therapist. Potential failure modes were identified for each step in the process map as well as potential causes and end effect. A risk priority numbermore » was assigned to each cause. Results: The process map identified 66 individual steps (see attached supporting document). Corrective actions were developed for areas of high risk priority number. Wrong site treatment is at higher risk for trigeminal neuralgia treatment due to the lack of site specific pathologic imaging on MR and CT – additional site specific checks were implemented to minimize the risk of wrong site treatment. Failed collision checks resulted from an insufficient collision model in the treatment planning system and a plan template was developed to address this problem. Conclusion: Failure modes and effects analysis is an effective tool for developing quality improvement in high risk radiotherapy procedures such as functional radiosurgery.« less
  • Purpose: To perform a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the process for treating superficial skin cancers with the Xoft Axxent electronic brachytherapy (eBx) system, given the recent introduction of expanded quality control (QC) initiatives at our institution. Methods: A process map was developed listing all steps in superficial treatments with Xoft eBx, from the initial patient consult to the completion of the treatment course. The process map guided the FMEA to identify the failure modes for each step in the treatment workflow and assign Risk Priority Numbers (RPN), calculated as the product of the failure mode’s probability ofmore » occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D). FMEA was done with and without the inclusion of recent QC initiatives such as increased staffing, physics oversight, standardized source calibration, treatment planning and documentation. The failure modes with the highest RPNs were identified and contrasted before and after introduction of the QC initiatives. Results: Based on the FMEA, the failure modes with the highest RPN were related to source calibration, treatment planning, and patient setup/treatment delivery (Fig. 1). The introduction of additional physics oversight, standardized planning and safety initiatives such as checklists and time-outs reduced the RPNs of these failure modes. High-risk failure modes that could be mitigated with improved hardware and software interlocks were identified. Conclusion: The FMEA analysis identified the steps in the treatment process presenting the highest risk. The introduction of enhanced QC initiatives mitigated the risk of some of these failure modes by decreasing their probability of occurrence and increasing their detectability. This analysis demonstrates the importance of well-designed QC policies, procedures and oversight in a Xoft eBx programme for treatment of superficial skin cancers. Unresolved high risk failure modes highlight the need for non-procedural quality initiatives such as improved planning software and more robust hardware interlock systems.« less