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Title: Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309

Abstract

Andreeva Bay is located near Murmansk in the Russian Federation close to the Norwegian border. The ex-naval site was used to de-fuel nuclear-powered submarines and icebreakers during the Cold War. Approximately 22,000 fuel assemblies remain in three Dry Storage Units (DSUs) which means that Andreeva Bay has one of the largest stockpiles of highly enriched spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the world. The high contamination and deteriorating condition of the SNF canisters has made improvements to the management of the SNF a high priority for the international community for safety, security and environmental reasons. International Donors have, since 2002, provided support to projects at Andreeva concerned with improving the management of the SNF. This long-term programme of work has been coordinated between the International Donors and responsible bodies within the Russian Federation. Options for the safe and secure management of SNF at Andreeva Bay were considered in 2004 and developed by a number of Russian Institutes with international participation. This consisted of site investigations, surveys and studies to understand the technical challenges. A principal agreement was reached that the SNF would be removed from the site altogether and transported to Russia's reprocessing facility at Mayak in the Urals. The analyticalmore » studies provided the information necessary to develop the construction plan for the site. Following design and regulatory processes, stakeholders endorsed the technical solution in April 2007. This detailed the processes, facilities and equipment required to safely remove the SNF and identified other site services and support facilities required on the site. Implementation of this strategy is now well underway with the facilities in various states of construction. Physical works have been performed to address the most urgent tasks including weather protection over one of the DSUs, installation of shielding over the cells, provision of radiation protection infrastructure and general preparation of the site for construction of the facilities for the removal of the SNF. This paper describes the development and implementation of the strategy and work to improve the safe and secure management of SNF, preparing it for retrieval and removal from Andreeva Bay. (authors)« less

Authors:
;  [1]
  1. Nuvia Limited (United Kingdom)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
WM Symposia, 1628 E. Southern Avenue, Suite 9-332, Tempe, AZ 85282 (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
22225041
Report Number(s):
INIS-US-13-WM-13309
TRN: US14V0495045996
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: WM2013: Waste Management Conference: International collaboration and continuous improvement, Phoenix, AZ (United States), 24-28 Feb 2013; Other Information: Country of input: France; 5 refs.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; BAYS; DRY STORAGE; RADIATION PROTECTION; RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT; REMOVAL; REPROCESSING; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; SAFETY; SPENT FUELS; SUBMARINES; URALS

Citation Formats

Field, D., and McAtamney, N.. Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309. United States: N. p., 2013. Web.
Field, D., & McAtamney, N.. Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309. United States.
Field, D., and McAtamney, N.. Mon . "Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_22225041,
title = {Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309},
author = {Field, D. and McAtamney, N.},
abstractNote = {Andreeva Bay is located near Murmansk in the Russian Federation close to the Norwegian border. The ex-naval site was used to de-fuel nuclear-powered submarines and icebreakers during the Cold War. Approximately 22,000 fuel assemblies remain in three Dry Storage Units (DSUs) which means that Andreeva Bay has one of the largest stockpiles of highly enriched spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the world. The high contamination and deteriorating condition of the SNF canisters has made improvements to the management of the SNF a high priority for the international community for safety, security and environmental reasons. International Donors have, since 2002, provided support to projects at Andreeva concerned with improving the management of the SNF. This long-term programme of work has been coordinated between the International Donors and responsible bodies within the Russian Federation. Options for the safe and secure management of SNF at Andreeva Bay were considered in 2004 and developed by a number of Russian Institutes with international participation. This consisted of site investigations, surveys and studies to understand the technical challenges. A principal agreement was reached that the SNF would be removed from the site altogether and transported to Russia's reprocessing facility at Mayak in the Urals. The analytical studies provided the information necessary to develop the construction plan for the site. Following design and regulatory processes, stakeholders endorsed the technical solution in April 2007. This detailed the processes, facilities and equipment required to safely remove the SNF and identified other site services and support facilities required on the site. Implementation of this strategy is now well underway with the facilities in various states of construction. Physical works have been performed to address the most urgent tasks including weather protection over one of the DSUs, installation of shielding over the cells, provision of radiation protection infrastructure and general preparation of the site for construction of the facilities for the removal of the SNF. This paper describes the development and implementation of the strategy and work to improve the safe and secure management of SNF, preparing it for retrieval and removal from Andreeva Bay. (authors)},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2013},
month = {Mon Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2013}
}

Conference:
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  • The Norwegian Government is promoting improvements in radiation protection and nuclear safety in North-West Russia. Among priority areas there is the improvement of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, as well as remediation operations at the Shore Technical Bases operated by Federal Enterprise SevRAO at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha on the Kola Peninsula. The extreme radiological conditions at these sites present novel difficulties for regulatory supervision of operations. The situation at these sites is such that the existing regulations are applicable, and actions to remedy the situation are not permitted under the current regulatory regime. An improved regulatory process,more » including development of special norms and rules, is required to take account of this unusual situation. The Norwegian strategy includes not only support to industrial projects, but also support to Russian Federation regulatory bodies, to ensure that work is carried out in compliance with Russian Federation law, taking account of international recommendations and other national good practice as relevant in the RF. Accordingly, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority has set up a programme of cooperation with the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), which is the primary radiation protection authority in the RF. The work is carried out with technical input from the Russian Institute of Biophysics and with inputs from western technical support organisations. The overall objective of the work is to promote effective and efficient regulatory supervision of SevRAO activities at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha within the scope of responsibilities of FMBA. This paper describes the results of an initial threat assessment which allows consideration of the cross-cutting issues associated with developing an overall effective site management plan which deals with short- and long-term issues, and protection of workers as well as of the public and the environment, while achieving a timely and effective use of resources in order to solve the problems. (authors)« less
  • This paper explains the background to the projects, and the setting up of the contracts to dismantle two Oscar-I submarines and one Victor-III submarine. As a pre -cursor to the dismantling, Russian documentation covering environmental, safety, operational and technical issues had to be prepared and submitted to the Russian regulatory bodies for approval, including a full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the projects. In addition to the dismantling projects, funds were also made available for shipyard infrastructure improvement projects necessary to ensure the safe and efficient completion of the projects. The paper describes these aspects as well as the submarinesmore » themselves and gives an overview of the dismantling process. It also describes the nature of the wastes produced, including handling and processing together with the safety and environmental issues. Project Management and monitoring contracted to RWE NUKEM by the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is described emphasizing the importance of strong working relationships between British and Russian teams. Finally the paper discusses the 'end products' of the Oscar-I and Victor-III dismantling and how the projects have provided a useful, high-profile platform on which to demonstrate the success of the DTI and their contractors in helping the U.K. meet its commitments under the Global Partnership Initiative. (authors)« less
  • The K East and K West Basins, built in the early 1950s, have been used to store irradiated nuclear fuel from the Hanford N Reactor. This fuel, which is referred to as spent nuclear fuel (SNF), has been stored underwater since 1975 in KE Basin and since 1981 in KW Basin. There are 54,000 N Reactor fuel assemblies in 3,800 canisters in the K West Basin, and 51,000 fuel assemblies in 3,700 canisters in the K East Basin that total 2,100 metric tons of SNF.
  • In early December 2000, the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation successfully shipped the first of 2100 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel to a new dry storage facility. The objective of the project is to remove the threat of contamination to the Columbia River, of which the Hanford Reach is the last free flowing stretch. The project uses remote systems in the Hanford Site's K Basins to reduce exposure to operators performing the decapping, washing, sorting, and repackaging of the fuel. This paper discusses the equipment involved in the fuel retrieval process. The design requirements weremore » based on minimal development and deployment while minimizing radiological exposure to personnel during the fuel retrieval campaign. Minimal development limited the risks for schedule and cost, and minimal deployment minimized disruption of the facility's ongoing operations. The result is a mixture of manual past practices, remote control, and computer control. The fuel retrieval process removes lids from the fuel canister, washes the fuel assemblies, sorts the assemblies into loadable fuel and scrap, and puts the loadable fuel into the fuel basket. The baskets are loaded with 48 to 54 fuel assemblies and placed into the multicanister overpack 5 or six deep, depending on the fuel type. The multicanister overpack is sent to the cold vacuum drying facility to remove moisture then sent to the canister storage building for long term dry storage. The fuel retrieval process is intended to remove visible sludge and corrosion products from the spent nuclear fuel assemblies. Inadequately cleaned fuel assemblies can lengthen the drying process and corrosion products pose a pressure buildup problem within the multicanister overpack. After installation, the selected systems were put through four phases of testing. The first phase tested individual systems. Phase 2 testing involved proficiency tests using canisters with simulated fuel elements. Once the process was being satisfactorily performed, DOE gave approval to start the third phase of testing, which started October 18, 2000. This phase used the spent nuclear fuel for operational testing. Test results from this phase were used to determine if initiating Phase 4 testing was warranted. Phase 4 testing was for process validation to demonstrate the systems' ability to process all ages of fuel to meet requirements for the drying process and dry storage. The project is expected to finish the fourth phase of testing in February 2001 and then proceed into production mode. Removal of all fuel from the K West basin is scheduled for completion in December of 2002. K East basin cleanup is scheduled to start during that same time and be completed two years later.« less
  • The design of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) casks used in the present SNF disposition systems has evolved from early concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle. The reality today is much different from that envisioned by early nuclear scientists. Most SNF is placed in pool storage, awaiting reprocessing (as in Russia) or disposal at a geologic SNF repository (as in the United States). Very little transport of SNF occurs. This paper examines the requirements for SNF casks from today's perspective and attempts to answer this question: What type of SNF cask would be produced if we were to start over andmore » design SNF casks based on today's requirements? The characteristics for a next-generation SNF cask system are examined and are found to be essentially the same in Russia and the United States. It appears that the new depleted uranium dioxide (DUO2)-steel cermet material will enable these requirements to be met. Depleted uranium (DU) is uranium in which a portion of the 235U isotope has been removed during a uranium enrichment process. The DUO2-steel cermet material is described. The United States and Russia are cooperating toward the development of a next-generation, dual-purpose, storage and transport SNF system.« less