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Title: AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

Abstract

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple,more » diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)« less

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;  [1]
  1. Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
22105928
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: ICAPP '12: 2012 International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants, Chicago, IL (United States), 24-28 Jun 2012; Other Information: Country of input: France; 6 refs.; Related Information: In: Proceedings of the 2012 International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants - ICAPP '12| 2799 p.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS; COOLING SYSTEMS; DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS; FUEL ELEMENT FAILURE; FUEL STORAGE POOLS; HEAT SINKS; HEATING LOAD; OUTAGES; PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION; PWR TYPE REACTORS; REACTOR MAINTENANCE; REACTOR SHUTDOWN; RISK ASSESSMENT; SAFETY ANALYSIS; SPENT FUEL STORAGE; SPRAY COOLING; WATER

Citation Formats

Gorgemans, J., Mulhollem, L., Glavin, J., Pfister, A., Conway, L., Schulz, T., Oriani, L., Cummins, E., and Winters, J. AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling. United States: N. p., 2012. Web.
Gorgemans, J., Mulhollem, L., Glavin, J., Pfister, A., Conway, L., Schulz, T., Oriani, L., Cummins, E., & Winters, J. AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling. United States.
Gorgemans, J., Mulhollem, L., Glavin, J., Pfister, A., Conway, L., Schulz, T., Oriani, L., Cummins, E., and Winters, J. Sun . "AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_22105928,
title = {AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling},
author = {Gorgemans, J. and Mulhollem, L. and Glavin, J. and Pfister, A. and Conway, L. and Schulz, T. and Oriani, L. and Cummins, E. and Winters, J.},
abstractNote = {The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sun Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2012},
month = {Sun Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2012}
}

Conference:
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