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Title: The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious

Abstract

In the electricity sector the use of merger remedies is a risky game to play. To protect consumers, economics suggests that merger controls be more cautious and stringent than in other sectors. It is better to risk being wrong in prohibiting a merger or imposing severe procompetitive remedies than to risk being wrong in approving a merger with possibly ineffective remedies. (author)

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
20700744
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Electricity Journal; Journal Volume: 19; Journal Issue: 2; Other Information: Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY; ENERGY POLICY; BUSINESS; RECOMMENDATIONS

Citation Formats

Barquin, Julian, Bergman, Lars, Crampes, Claude, Glachant, Jean-Michel, Green, Richard, Von Hirschhausen, Christian, Leveque, Francois, and Stoft, Steven. The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious. United States: N. p., 2006. Web. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2006.01.002.
Barquin, Julian, Bergman, Lars, Crampes, Claude, Glachant, Jean-Michel, Green, Richard, Von Hirschhausen, Christian, Leveque, Francois, & Stoft, Steven. The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious. United States. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2006.01.002.
Barquin, Julian, Bergman, Lars, Crampes, Claude, Glachant, Jean-Michel, Green, Richard, Von Hirschhausen, Christian, Leveque, Francois, and Stoft, Steven. Wed . "The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious". United States. doi:10.1016/j.tej.2006.01.002.
@article{osti_20700744,
title = {The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities Are Right to Be Cautious},
author = {Barquin, Julian and Bergman, Lars and Crampes, Claude and Glachant, Jean-Michel and Green, Richard and Von Hirschhausen, Christian and Leveque, Francois and Stoft, Steven},
abstractNote = {In the electricity sector the use of merger remedies is a risky game to play. To protect consumers, economics suggests that merger controls be more cautious and stringent than in other sectors. It is better to risk being wrong in prohibiting a merger or imposing severe procompetitive remedies than to risk being wrong in approving a merger with possibly ineffective remedies. (author)},
doi = {10.1016/j.tej.2006.01.002},
journal = {Electricity Journal},
number = 2,
volume = 19,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2006},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2006}
}
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