Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over a lossy and noisy channel
Journal Article
·
· Physical Review. A
- Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI), Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193 (Japan)
- Institut fuer Theoretische Physik I and Institute for Optics, Information and Photonics (Max-Planck Research Group), Universitaet Erlangen-Nuernberg, Staudtstrasse 7/B3, 91058 Erlangen (Germany)
We show that the security proof of the Bennett 1992 protocol over loss-free channel given by Tamaki, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 167904 (2003)] can be adapted to accommodate loss. We assumed that Bob's detectors discriminate between single-photon states on one hand and vacuum state or multiphoton states on the other hand.
- OSTI ID:
- 20640842
- Journal Information:
- Physical Review. A, Vol. 69, Issue 3; Other Information: DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.69.032316; (c) 2004 The American Physical Society; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); ISSN 1050-2947
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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