A Mathematical Framework for Representing Cyber-Physical System Interdependencies and Resilience
- BATTELLE (PACIFIC NW LAB)
U.S. critical infrastructure is increasingly composed of integrated cyber-physical systems (CPS) whose components are operationally interdependent. These interdependencies can create additional vulnerabilities beyond those that are typically evaluated through independent physical and cyber risk assessments. These additional vulnerabilities, previously undetected at the sub-system and/or component level, could cause cascading effects across both the physical and cyber domains that could lead to infrastructure disruption or failure. This paper will review an initial mathematical framework developed to help understand the dynamics of these interfacing physical and cyber components at a holistic system level. The resulting framework also provides a method for modeling and assessing the resilience of CPS in complex and adaptive systems. It frames the system in terms of mission performance and the potential effects to performance caused by attacks that are cyber, physical, or blended in nature. The framework utilizes a systems-based, state-space modeling approach to reason about risk, resilience, and interdependencies in CPS. Probabilities are applied to each CPS component regarding a threat (both man-made and natural) and the likelihood of that particular component being impacted, along with indirect impact to other interdependent components. These component-level impacts from threats then translate into mission-level impact and systemic state change.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1634989
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-115668
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Proceedings of the Industrial and Systems Engineering Research Conference (ISERC 2016), May 21-24, 2016, Anaheim, CA
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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