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Title: Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.

Abstract

Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non - deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisi t the so - called Bud dy Tag con cept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item i tself. Verification of the pair ings between tags and limited items would take place during a short - notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the l ast 24 48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a numbermore » of single - site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discov ery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In t his project, we developed a bud dy - tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. T his paper summarizes the perfor mance requirem ents for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.« less

Authors:
;  [1]; ; ;  [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. Princeton
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
State Department
OSTI Identifier:
1618261
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-12727
658802
DOE Contract Number:  
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Deland, Sharon M., Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Smartt, Heidi A., Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, and Reimold, Benjamin. Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1618261.
Deland, Sharon M., Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Smartt, Heidi A., Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, & Reimold, Benjamin. Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1618261
Deland, Sharon M., Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Smartt, Heidi A., Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, and Reimold, Benjamin. Wed . "Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/1618261. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1618261.
@article{osti_1618261,
title = {Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.},
author = {Deland, Sharon M. and Glaser, Alexander and Brotz, Jay Kristoffer and Smartt, Heidi A. and Kim, Andrew and Steingart, Dan and Reimold, Benjamin},
abstractNote = {Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non - deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisi t the so - called Bud dy Tag con cept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item i tself. Verification of the pair ings between tags and limited items would take place during a short - notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the l ast 24 48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single - site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discov ery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In t his project, we developed a bud dy - tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. T his paper summarizes the perfor mance requirem ents for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.},
doi = {10.2172/1618261},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1618261}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2017},
month = {11}
}