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Title: Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials

Abstract

There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress.

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., Livermore, CA (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Defense Programs (DP) (US)
OSTI Identifier:
16135
Report Number(s):
UCRL-ID-127436
ON: DE97053424; TRN: US200432%%300
DOE Contract Number:  
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Supercedes report DE97053424; PBD: 3 Feb 1997
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS; 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; DETECTION; EFFICIENCY; ENERGY RESOLUTION; IMPLEMENTATION; MONITORING; MONITORS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PLUTONIUM; RADIATION TRANSPORT; RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS; SPECTROMETERS

Citation Formats

Gosnell, T. B., LLNL, Hall, J M, Jam, C L, Knapp, D A, Koenig, Z M, Luke, S J, Pohl, B A, Schach von Wittenau, A, and Wolford, J K. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials. United States: N. p., 1997. Web. doi:10.2172/16135.
Gosnell, T. B., LLNL, Hall, J M, Jam, C L, Knapp, D A, Koenig, Z M, Luke, S J, Pohl, B A, Schach von Wittenau, A, & Wolford, J K. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials. United States. doi:10.2172/16135.
Gosnell, T. B., LLNL, Hall, J M, Jam, C L, Knapp, D A, Koenig, Z M, Luke, S J, Pohl, B A, Schach von Wittenau, A, and Wolford, J K. Mon . "Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials". United States. doi:10.2172/16135. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/16135.
@article{osti_16135,
title = {Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials},
author = {Gosnell, T. B., LLNL and Hall, J M and Jam, C L and Knapp, D A and Koenig, Z M and Luke, S J and Pohl, B A and Schach von Wittenau, A and Wolford, J K},
abstractNote = {There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress.},
doi = {10.2172/16135},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {1997},
month = {2}
}