Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids

doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742

Title: Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids

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Abstract

Not provided.

Authors:: Lin, Hui; Slagell, Adam; Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T.; Sauer, Peter W.; Iyer, Ravishankar K.

Publication Date:: 2018-01-01

Research Org.:: Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)

OSTI Identifier:: 1541550

DOE Contract Number:: OE0000097; OE0000780

Resource Type:: Journal Article

Journal Name:: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid

Additional Journal Information:: Journal Volume: 9; Journal Issue: 1; Journal ID: ISSN 1949-3053

Publisher:: IEEE

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: Engineering

Citation Formats


                    Lin, Hui, Slagell, Adam, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T., Sauer, Peter W., and Iyer, Ravishankar K. Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids.  United States: N. p., 2018. 
        Web.  doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742.

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                    Lin, Hui, Slagell, Adam, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T., Sauer, Peter W., & Iyer, Ravishankar K. Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids.  United States.  doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742.

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                    Lin, Hui, Slagell, Adam, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T., Sauer, Peter W., and Iyer, Ravishankar K. Mon .  
        "Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids".  United States.  doi:10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742.

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@article{osti_1541550,

  title        = {Runtime Semantic Security Analysis to Detect and Mitigate Control-Related Attacks in Power Grids},

  author       = {Lin, Hui and Slagell, Adam and Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T. and Sauer, Peter W. and Iyer, Ravishankar K.},

  abstractNote = {Not provided.},

  doi          = {10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742},

  journal      = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},

  issn         = {1949-3053},

  number       = 1,

  volume       = 9,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {2018},

  month        = {1}

}

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DOI: 10.1109/tsg.2016.2547742

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