Resilience Analysis of DC Microgrids under Denial of Service Threats
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Lemont, IL (United States)
- Temple Univ., Philadelphia, PA (United States)
- Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX (United States)
This paper develops a resilience analysis framework to study the fault ride-through capability of direct current (DC) microgrids in unknown denial of service (DoS) cyber incidents. DoS can be a frequent threat to DC microgrids with advanced controllers that hinge on active information exchanges: it can paralyze data communications and cause control ineptness or even system instability. Furthermore, we show that temporal DoS incidents render the DC microgrid cyber-physical topology and parameters time-varying and cause them to jump between faulty conditions. As existing DC microgrid stability analysis results are primarily developed from time-invariant systems, they might not be valid for the DoS interrupted systems. In this paper, we seek to study whether a DC microgrid is resilient against time-varying unknown DoS incidents. The problem is formulated as a stability analysis problem for a system with randomly switching dynamics. Scalable conditions are developed to provide provable resilience guarantees. In addition, we exploit the special structure of the conditions to yield quantified resilience measure by convex optimization techniques. As a result, the measure can be used for the evaluation of the resilience of different DC microgrid design against DoS incidents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed work using simulation case studies.
- Research Organization:
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Electricity (OE)
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC02-06CH11357
- OSTI ID:
- 1518477
- Journal Information:
- IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 34, Issue 4; ISSN 0885-8950
- Publisher:
- IEEECopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Web of Science
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