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Title: Plan for Developing and Implementing the LLNL Plutonium Facility and Packaging Program

Abstract

The LLNL Plutonium Facility uses glove boxes for performing operations involving special nuclear materials (SNM) that for the most part are not connected to each other. Having standalone glove boxes mandates bag-in and bag-out operations to provide personnel safety in material transfers. The use of inexpensive disposable primary and secondary containers (i.e., food pack and paint cans) decreases operational risks by reducing glove box transfers. Typically, containers consist of produce cans, paint cans, lard cans, and egg cans; however, some cans with bolted flanges have been used for protection from oxidation or to reduce dose to the handler. The lard cans and egg cans are slip lid cans and have predominantly been used for the outermost containment, or secondary can, in the packaging configuration. For non-weapon parts the packaging has generally been, from the inner most container to the outside container as (1) the primary can, (2) a bag-out bag, (3) a poultry bag, and (4) a secondary can. This system has evolved over many years and has proven to be effective. During FY2002 through FY2004, the ''Legacy'' material projects at LLNL inspected, repackaged and processed (if necessary), approximately 1500 items, which translates to at least 3000 containers (primary andmore » secondary). There were no failed containers identified during this repacking campaign; however, a documented technical basis does not exist for LLNL's current packaging system. In addition, this system may not meet drop test criteria. To assure that material is packaged and stored safely and consistently, LLNL is developing criteria for packaging and storage of special nuclear materials, as well as the associated technical basis. This document describes the plan for developing these criteria, technical basis, and implementation of the approved packaging and storage plan.« less

Authors:
; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., Livermore, CA (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
US Department of Energy (US)
OSTI Identifier:
15016337
Report Number(s):
UCRL-TR-210907
TRN: US0502263
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 29 Mar 2005
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; CONFIGURATION; CONTAINERS; CONTAINMENT; FLANGES; FOOD; FOWL; GLOVES; IMPLEMENTATION; OXIDATION; PACKAGING; PERSONNEL; PLUTONIUM; SAFETY; SLIP; STORAGE

Citation Formats

Dodson, K E, Burch, J G, Krikorian, O H, and Riley, D C. Plan for Developing and Implementing the LLNL Plutonium Facility and Packaging Program. United States: N. p., 2005. Web. doi:10.2172/15016337.
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Dodson, K E, Burch, J G, Krikorian, O H, & Riley, D C. Plan for Developing and Implementing the LLNL Plutonium Facility and Packaging Program. United States. doi:10.2172/15016337.
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Dodson, K E, Burch, J G, Krikorian, O H, and Riley, D C. Tue . "Plan for Developing and Implementing the LLNL Plutonium Facility and Packaging Program". United States. doi:10.2172/15016337. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/15016337.
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@article{osti_15016337,
title = {Plan for Developing and Implementing the LLNL Plutonium Facility and Packaging Program},
author = {Dodson, K E and Burch, J G and Krikorian, O H and Riley, D C},
abstractNote = {The LLNL Plutonium Facility uses glove boxes for performing operations involving special nuclear materials (SNM) that for the most part are not connected to each other. Having standalone glove boxes mandates bag-in and bag-out operations to provide personnel safety in material transfers. The use of inexpensive disposable primary and secondary containers (i.e., food pack and paint cans) decreases operational risks by reducing glove box transfers. Typically, containers consist of produce cans, paint cans, lard cans, and egg cans; however, some cans with bolted flanges have been used for protection from oxidation or to reduce dose to the handler. The lard cans and egg cans are slip lid cans and have predominantly been used for the outermost containment, or secondary can, in the packaging configuration. For non-weapon parts the packaging has generally been, from the inner most container to the outside container as (1) the primary can, (2) a bag-out bag, (3) a poultry bag, and (4) a secondary can. This system has evolved over many years and has proven to be effective. During FY2002 through FY2004, the ''Legacy'' material projects at LLNL inspected, repackaged and processed (if necessary), approximately 1500 items, which translates to at least 3000 containers (primary and secondary). There were no failed containers identified during this repacking campaign; however, a documented technical basis does not exist for LLNL's current packaging system. In addition, this system may not meet drop test criteria. To assure that material is packaged and stored safely and consistently, LLNL is developing criteria for packaging and storage of special nuclear materials, as well as the associated technical basis. This document describes the plan for developing these criteria, technical basis, and implementation of the approved packaging and storage plan.},
doi = {10.2172/15016337},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Mar 29 00:00:00 EST 2005},
month = {Tue Mar 29 00:00:00 EST 2005}
}
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DOI:  10.2172/15016337
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