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Title: Russia's views on cruise missiles in the context of START III

Abstract

The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Russia to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine which states that nuclear weapons can be used ''in situations critical to the national security of the RF and its allies.'' In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will remain for the foreseeable future because the economy will have to improve significantly before a conventional force build up can be contemplated. Yet, despite Russia's need to rely on nuclear weapons, even this may be problematic because its economic plight may create difficulties in maintaining its current level of nuclear forces. Thus, Russia has a keen interest in negotiating a treaty to reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces below START II levels and would prefer to go even beyond the 2,000-2,500 numbers agreed to by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997. Sergei Rogov, an influential defense analyst, believes that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will fall below 1,000 warheads by 2010 irrespective of arms control agreements. Accordingly, Russia is keen to ensure rough parity with the US. To retain a credible deterrent posture at these lower levels, Russia believesmore » that it is important to restrain US sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--forces that have heretofore not been captured as strategic weapons in the START treaties. Russian officials reason that once strategic nuclear forces go to very low levels, SLCM capabilities become strategically significant. In fact, according to two well-known Russian security analysts, Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, Russia's current START III negotiating position calls for the complete elimination of all SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Prior to assessing Russia's position regarding cruise missiles and START III, I will examine Russia's overall view of its security position vis-a-vis the US in order to provide background for Russia's negotiating stance. I will also suggest how the US and Russia might approach START III in a manner that is equitable and focuses on creating a more stable environment.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
US Department of Energy (US)
OSTI Identifier:
15005861
Report Number(s):
UCRL-JC-141172
TRN: US200402%%182
DOE Contract Number:  
W-7405-ENG-48
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Conference, Washington, DC (US), 12/08/2000; Other Information: PBD: 30 Oct 2000
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; ARMS CONTROL; CRUISE MISSILES; ECONOMICS; NATIONAL SECURITY; NUCLEAR FORCES; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PARITY; SECURITY; TREATIES; WEAPONS

Citation Formats

Ball, D Y. Russia's views on cruise missiles in the context of START III. United States: N. p., 2000. Web.
Ball, D Y. Russia's views on cruise missiles in the context of START III. United States.
Ball, D Y. Mon . "Russia's views on cruise missiles in the context of START III". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/15005861.
@article{osti_15005861,
title = {Russia's views on cruise missiles in the context of START III},
author = {Ball, D Y},
abstractNote = {The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Russia to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine which states that nuclear weapons can be used ''in situations critical to the national security of the RF and its allies.'' In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will remain for the foreseeable future because the economy will have to improve significantly before a conventional force build up can be contemplated. Yet, despite Russia's need to rely on nuclear weapons, even this may be problematic because its economic plight may create difficulties in maintaining its current level of nuclear forces. Thus, Russia has a keen interest in negotiating a treaty to reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces below START II levels and would prefer to go even beyond the 2,000-2,500 numbers agreed to by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997. Sergei Rogov, an influential defense analyst, believes that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will fall below 1,000 warheads by 2010 irrespective of arms control agreements. Accordingly, Russia is keen to ensure rough parity with the US. To retain a credible deterrent posture at these lower levels, Russia believes that it is important to restrain US sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--forces that have heretofore not been captured as strategic weapons in the START treaties. Russian officials reason that once strategic nuclear forces go to very low levels, SLCM capabilities become strategically significant. In fact, according to two well-known Russian security analysts, Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, Russia's current START III negotiating position calls for the complete elimination of all SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Prior to assessing Russia's position regarding cruise missiles and START III, I will examine Russia's overall view of its security position vis-a-vis the US in order to provide background for Russia's negotiating stance. I will also suggest how the US and Russia might approach START III in a manner that is equitable and focuses on creating a more stable environment.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2000},
month = {10}
}

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