The Pepcon Disaster-Causative Factors and potential Preventive and Mitigative Measures
On May 4, 1988, the PEPCON plant experienced three major and several smaller explosions that caused over $70 million in property damage and caused two deaths. The PEPCON plant produced Ammonium Perchlorate (AP), a major ingredient for rocket fuel. The PEPCON plant and the nearby Kidd Marshmallow plant were totally destroyed by the detonations. The initiating event for the explosions was a fire that originated in the Batch Dryer Building and spread to adjacent storage. Several factors combined to cause the AP in the major storage fields to detonate, the most important being lack of adequate separation between storage units. Welding and flame cutting procedure with poor fire watch protocol was the prime candidate for fire ignition. There were no automatic fire suppression systems at the plant. Buildings including the Batch Dryer Building were made of combustible building material (fiberglass). There was poor housekeeping and no control of AP dust generation. AP was stored in combustible polyethylene drums, aluminum tote bins, 30-gallon steel storage drums and fiber reinforced tote bags. There were high-density storage practices. In addition, a contributing factor to the rapid fire-spread was that the wind that day was blowing directly from the batch dryer building to the storage areas. This paper claims that if codes, standards, and well-known hazard identification safety techniques were implemented at PEPCON, then the disaster would have been averted. A limited scope probabilistic risk assessment was conducted to establish the effectiveness of various preventive and mitigative features that could have been deployed to avert the disaster. The major hazard at the PEPCON site was fire and explosion involving the processing, production and storage of AP, which was then and is currently stored as a class 4 oxidizer. Since minute quantities of contamination can cause AP to be detonable by shock, there has been an ongoing debate concerning its reclassification to a class-A explosive.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 15005088
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-JC-154704; TRN: US200414%%586
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 4th International Seminar ''Fire and Explosion Hazards'', Londonderry, Northern Ireland (IE), 09/08/2003--09/12/2003; Other Information: PBD: 25 Jul 2003
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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