A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems

Rao, Nageswara S.; He, Fei; Agwuegbo, Chiamaka; Ma, Chris Y. T.

Title: A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems

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Abstract

This research studies the defense strategy of an interdependent system in the face of rational attacks. We propose a sequential game between an attacker and a defender on an interdependent system of systems (SoS) to explore the effect of interdependency on the optimal defense strategy. An algorithm of backward induction isdeveloped to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game.The attacker is the first mover as he applies an attack strategy on constituent systems that maximize his utility. The defender observes and responds by a defense strategy that maximizes her utility. Both players’ utilities are evaluated as the difference between a player’s reward due to SoS functionality (dysfunctionality) and the cost of the action. The sensitivity analysis compares the effects of different parameters on the attacker’s and defender’s strategies such as the effectiveness of defense (attack), the unit cost of defense (attack) and the interdependency level on constituent systems.

Authors:

^[1]; He, Fei ^[2]; Agwuegbo, Chiamaka ^[2]; Ma, Chris Y. T. ^[3]

ORNL
Texas A&M University, Kingsville, TX, USA
Hang Seng Management College, Hon Kong

Publication Date:: 2018-07-01

Research Org.:: Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Science (SC), Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR)

OSTI Identifier:: 1468114

DOE Contract Number:: AC05-00OR22725

Resource Type:: Conference

Resource Relation:: Conference: 21th International Conference on Information Fusion - Cambridge, , United Kingdom - 7/10/2018 4:00:00 AM-7/13/2018 4:00:00 AM

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Citation Formats


                    Rao, Nageswara S., He, Fei, Agwuegbo, Chiamaka, and Ma, Chris Y. T. A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems.  United States: N. p., 2018. 
        Web.

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                    Rao, Nageswara S., He, Fei, Agwuegbo, Chiamaka, & Ma, Chris Y. T. A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems.  United States.

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                    Rao, Nageswara S., He, Fei, Agwuegbo, Chiamaka, and Ma, Chris Y. T. 2018.  
        "A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems".  United States.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1468114.

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@article{osti_1468114,

  title        = {A Sequential Game of Defense and Attack on an Interdependent System of Systems},

  author       = {Rao, Nageswara S. and He, Fei and Agwuegbo, Chiamaka and Ma, Chris Y. T.},

  abstractNote = {This research studies the defense strategy of an interdependent system in the face of rational attacks. We propose a sequential game between an attacker and a defender on an interdependent system of systems (SoS) to explore the effect of interdependency on the optimal defense strategy. An algorithm of backward induction isdeveloped to obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game.The attacker is the first mover as he applies an attack strategy on constituent systems that maximize his utility. The defender observes and responds by a defense strategy that maximizes her utility. Both players’ utilities are evaluated as the difference between a player’s reward due to SoS functionality (dysfunctionality) and the cost of the action. The sensitivity analysis compares the effects of different parameters on the attacker’s and defender’s strategies such as the effectiveness of defense (attack), the unit cost of defense (attack) and the interdependency level on constituent systems.},

  doi          = {},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1468114},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {2018},

  month        = {7}

}

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