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Title: Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets

Abstract

The wide integration of gas-fired units and implementation of power-to-gas technologies bring increasing interdependence among the natural gas and electricity infrastructures. This paper studies the equilibrium of the coupled gas and electricity markets, which is driven by the strategic offering behaviors: each producer endeavours to maximize its own profit by taking the market clearing process into consideration. The market equilibrium can be obtained from an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. A special diagonalization algorithm is devised, in which the unilateral equilibrium of the gas or electricity market is found in the inner loop given the rivals' strategies; the interactions of the two markets are tackled in the outer loop. Case studies on two test systems validate the proposed methodology.

Authors:
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Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
OSTI Identifier:
1466666
DOE Contract Number:  
AC02-06CH11357
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Journal Name:
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 33; Journal Issue: 1; Journal ID: ISSN 0885-8950
Publisher:
IEEE
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
bilevel optimization; electricity market; equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; interdependency; natural gas market

Citation Formats

Wang, Cheng, Wei, Wei, Wang, Jianhui, Liu, Feng, and Mei, Shengwei. Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets. United States: N. p., 2018. Web. doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2017.2698454.
Wang, Cheng, Wei, Wei, Wang, Jianhui, Liu, Feng, & Mei, Shengwei. Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets. United States. doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2017.2698454.
Wang, Cheng, Wei, Wei, Wang, Jianhui, Liu, Feng, and Mei, Shengwei. Mon . "Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets". United States. doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2017.2698454.
@article{osti_1466666,
title = {Strategic Offering and Equilibrium in Coupled Gas and Electricity Markets},
author = {Wang, Cheng and Wei, Wei and Wang, Jianhui and Liu, Feng and Mei, Shengwei},
abstractNote = {The wide integration of gas-fired units and implementation of power-to-gas technologies bring increasing interdependence among the natural gas and electricity infrastructures. This paper studies the equilibrium of the coupled gas and electricity markets, which is driven by the strategic offering behaviors: each producer endeavours to maximize its own profit by taking the market clearing process into consideration. The market equilibrium can be obtained from an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. A special diagonalization algorithm is devised, in which the unilateral equilibrium of the gas or electricity market is found in the inner loop given the rivals' strategies; the interactions of the two markets are tackled in the outer loop. Case studies on two test systems validate the proposed methodology.},
doi = {10.1109/tpwrs.2017.2698454},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Power Systems},
issn = {0885-8950},
number = 1,
volume = 33,
place = {United States},
year = {2018},
month = {1}
}