Self-Healing Attack-Resilient PMU Network for Power System Operation
In this paper, we propose a self-healing phasor measurement unit (PMU) network that exploits the features of dynamic and programmable configuration in a software-defined networking infrastructure to achieve resiliency against cyber-attacks. After a cyber-attack, the configuration of network switches is changed to isolate the compromised PMUs/phasor data concentrators to prevent further propagation of the attack; meanwhile, the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs will be reconnected to the network to "self-heal" and thus restore the observability of the power system. Specifically, we formulate an integer linear programming model to minimize the overhead of the self-healing process (e.g., the recovery latency), while considering the constraints of power system observability, hardware resources, and network topology. We also propose a heuristic algorithm to decrease the computational complexity. Case studies of a PMU network based on the IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems are used to validate the effectiveness of the self-healing mechanism.
- Research Organization:
- Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-06CH11357
- OSTI ID:
- 1460963
- Journal Information:
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 9, Issue 3; ISSN 1949-3053
- Publisher:
- IEEE
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
PMU Data Integrity Evaluation through Analytics on a Virtual Test-Bed
SHARP-Net: Platform for Self-Healing and Attack Resilient PMU Networks