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Title: Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators.

Abstract

Abstract not provided.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1431931
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-7080C
655066
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management annual meeting held July 16-21, 2017 in Indian Wells, CA.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Finch, Robert, Smartt, Heidi A., and Haddal, Risa. Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Finch, Robert, Smartt, Heidi A., & Haddal, Risa. Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators.. United States.
Finch, Robert, Smartt, Heidi A., and Haddal, Risa. Sat . "Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators.". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1431931.
@article{osti_1431931,
title = {Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators.},
author = {Finch, Robert and Smartt, Heidi A. and Haddal, Risa},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Conference:
Other availability
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  • Abstract not provided.
  • Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply sealsmore » or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.« less
  • In this paper we identify the procedural requirements which would have to be met in order that facility operators could complete some of the seal procedures normally performed by an inspector, thereby reducing the demands for inspector presence at certain crucial times. The most often quoted example is the possibility that, where material is transferred under Agency seal, it may not be necessary for an inspector to be present to reverify the seal on arrival at the receiving facility if a VACOSS type electronic seal is used to record the date and time of seal removal. Although other possible opportunitiesmore » may exist throughout the fuel cycle for operator use of Agency seals, only situations related to material shipments are considered here. 1 ref., 1 fig.« less
  • This report is the outcome of a study of the technical and procedural requirements which would need to be met if the Agency and facility operators were to agree that under certain circumstances the operator could remove or apply on Agency seal in the absence of an inspector. In the FRG and USA Support Programmes respectively an electronic seal (VACOSS) and a CCTV system (MIVS) have been developed. Through a joint project, an interface has been demonstrated which enables the seal data to be superimposed upon the surveillance data. This interface is briefly described in the appendix. A proposed applicationmore » for this integrated system is to allow facility operators to carry-out some of the seal procedures normally performed by an inspector, thereby reducing the need for inspector presence at certain crucial times.« less
  • As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) goals and Department of Energy (DOE) inventory requirements are frequently in conflict at facilities across the DOE complex. The authors wish, on one hand, to verify the presence of correct amounts of nuclear materials that are in storage or in process; yet on the other hand, we wish to achieve ALARA goals by keeping individual and collective exposures as low as social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations permit. The Experimental Inventory Verification System (EIVSystem) is a computer-based, camera-driven system that utilizes image processing technology to detect change in vault areas. Currently inmore » the test and evaluation phase at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, this system guards personnel. The EIVSystem continually monitors the vault, providing proof of changed status for objects sorted within the vault. This paper reports that these data could provide the basis for reducing inventory requirements when no change has occurred, thus helping implement ALARA policy; the data will also help describe there target area of an inventory when change has been shown to occur.« less