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Title: Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems.

Abstract

Abstract not provided.

Authors:
;  [1];  [1];  [1];  [2];  [3];  [4];
  1. (PNNL)
  2. (Pantex)
  3. (SRNL)
  4. (LANL)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1431823
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-8047C
655744
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the INMM 58th Annual Meeting held July 16-20, 2017 in Indian Wells, CA.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Angela Waterworth, Jacob Benz, Matthew MacDougall, Gary Cockrell, Dan Krementz, Danielle Hauck, and George Weeks. Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Angela Waterworth, Jacob Benz, Matthew MacDougall, Gary Cockrell, Dan Krementz, Danielle Hauck, & George Weeks. Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems.. United States.
Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Angela Waterworth, Jacob Benz, Matthew MacDougall, Gary Cockrell, Dan Krementz, Danielle Hauck, and George Weeks. Sat . "Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems.". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1431823.
@article{osti_1431823,
title = {Criteria for Comparative Evaluations of Treaty Verification Systems.},
author = {Brotz, Jay Kristoffer and Angela Waterworth and Jacob Benz and Matthew MacDougall and Gary Cockrell and Dan Krementz and Danielle Hauck and George Weeks},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Conference:
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  • The multinational Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is viewed by many as an effective way to rid the world of the threat of chemical weapons. Parties could, however, legitimately engage in certain CW-related activities in industry, agriculture, research, medicine, and law enforcement. Treaty verification requirements related to declared activities include: confirming destruction of declared CW stockpiles and production facilities; monitoring legitimate, treaty-allowed activities, such as production of certain industrial chemicals; and, detecting proscribed activities within the declared locations of treaty signatories, e.g., the illegal production of CW agents at a declared industrialmore » facility or the diversion or substitution of declared CW stockpile items. Verification requirements related to undeclared activities or locations include investigating possible clandestine CW stocks and production capability not originally declared by signatories; detecting clandestine, proscribed activities at facilities or sites that are not declared and hence not subject to routine inspection; and, investigating allegations of belligerent use of CW. We discuss here a possible set of criteria for assessing the effectiveness of CWC verification (and certain aspects of the bilateral CW reduction agreement). Although the criteria are applicable to the full range of verification requirements, the discussion emphasizes verification of declared activities and sites.« less
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