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Title: EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION OF SAFETY SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD USING DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A SYSTEM-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK.

Abstract

Abstract not provided.

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1431638
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-3572C
652269
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference held April 9-13, 2017 in Charlotte, NC.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna, Osborn, Douglas, Cardoni, Jeffrey N, Williams, Adam David, Parks, Mancel Jordan, Parks, Ethan Rutledge, Jones, Katherine A, Andrews, Nathan, Johnson, Emma Savannah, Mohagheghi, Amir H., and Cohn, Brian. EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION OF SAFETY SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD USING DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A SYSTEM-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna, Osborn, Douglas, Cardoni, Jeffrey N, Williams, Adam David, Parks, Mancel Jordan, Parks, Ethan Rutledge, Jones, Katherine A, Andrews, Nathan, Johnson, Emma Savannah, Mohagheghi, Amir H., & Cohn, Brian. EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION OF SAFETY SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD USING DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A SYSTEM-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK.. United States.
Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna, Osborn, Douglas, Cardoni, Jeffrey N, Williams, Adam David, Parks, Mancel Jordan, Parks, Ethan Rutledge, Jones, Katherine A, Andrews, Nathan, Johnson, Emma Savannah, Mohagheghi, Amir H., and Cohn, Brian. Sat . "EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION OF SAFETY SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD USING DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A SYSTEM-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK.". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1431638.
@article{osti_1431638,
title = {EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION OF SAFETY SECURITY AND SAFEGUARD USING DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A SYSTEM-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK.},
author = {Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna and Osborn, Douglas and Cardoni, Jeffrey N and Williams, Adam David and Parks, Mancel Jordan and Parks, Ethan Rutledge and Jones, Katherine A and Andrews, Nathan and Johnson, Emma Savannah and Mohagheghi, Amir H. and Cohn, Brian},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Sat Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Conference:
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