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Title: Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.

Abstract

Modern systems, such as physical security systems, are often designed to involve complex interactions of technological and human elements. Evaluation of the performance of these systems often overlooks the human element. A method is proposed here to expand the concept of sensitivity—as denoted by d’—from signal detection theory (Green & Swets 1966; Macmillan & Creelman 2005), which came out of the field of psychophysics, to cover not only human threat detection but also other human functions plus the performance of technical systems in a physical security system, thereby including humans in the overall evaluation of system performance. New in this method is the idea that probabilities of hits (accurate identification of threats) and false alarms (saying “threat” when there is not one), which are used to calculate d’ of the system, can be applied to technologies and, furthermore, to different functions in the system beyond simple yes-no threat detection. At the most succinct level, the method returns a single number that represents the effectiveness of a physical security system; specifically, the balance between the handling of actual threats and the distraction of false alarms. The method can be automated, and the constituent parts revealed, such that given an interaction graphmore » that indicates the functional associations of system elements and the individual probabilities of hits and false alarms for those elements, it will return the d’ of the entire system as well as d’ values for individual parts. The method can also return a measure of the response bias* of the system. One finding of this work is that the d’ for a physical security system can be relatively poor in spite of having excellent d’s for each of its individual functional elements.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1429788
Report Number(s):
SAND-2017-5790J
653738
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Program Document
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Citation Formats

Speed, Ann, Gauthier, John H., Hoffman, Matthew John, Wachtel, Amanda, Kittinger, Robert Scott, and Munoz-Ramos, Karina. Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Speed, Ann, Gauthier, John H., Hoffman, Matthew John, Wachtel, Amanda, Kittinger, Robert Scott, & Munoz-Ramos, Karina. Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.. United States.
Speed, Ann, Gauthier, John H., Hoffman, Matthew John, Wachtel, Amanda, Kittinger, Robert Scott, and Munoz-Ramos, Karina. Tue . "Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.". United States. doi:.
@article{osti_1429788,
title = {Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.},
author = {Speed, Ann and Gauthier, John H. and Hoffman, Matthew John and Wachtel, Amanda and Kittinger, Robert Scott and Munoz-Ramos, Karina},
abstractNote = {Modern systems, such as physical security systems, are often designed to involve complex interactions of technological and human elements. Evaluation of the performance of these systems often overlooks the human element. A method is proposed here to expand the concept of sensitivity—as denoted by d’—from signal detection theory (Green & Swets 1966; Macmillan & Creelman 2005), which came out of the field of psychophysics, to cover not only human threat detection but also other human functions plus the performance of technical systems in a physical security system, thereby including humans in the overall evaluation of system performance. New in this method is the idea that probabilities of hits (accurate identification of threats) and false alarms (saying “threat” when there is not one), which are used to calculate d’ of the system, can be applied to technologies and, furthermore, to different functions in the system beyond simple yes-no threat detection. At the most succinct level, the method returns a single number that represents the effectiveness of a physical security system; specifically, the balance between the handling of actual threats and the distraction of false alarms. The method can be automated, and the constituent parts revealed, such that given an interaction graph that indicates the functional associations of system elements and the individual probabilities of hits and false alarms for those elements, it will return the d’ of the entire system as well as d’ values for individual parts. The method can also return a measure of the response bias* of the system. One finding of this work is that the d’ for a physical security system can be relatively poor in spite of having excellent d’s for each of its individual functional elements.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue May 23 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Tue May 23 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

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