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Title: BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments.

Abstract

Abstract not provided.

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1426538
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-2588C
651597
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS).
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Choe, Yung Ryn, Aravind Machiry, Gustafson, Eric D, Chad Spensky, Chris Salls, Nick Stephens, Ruoyu Wang, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Choe, Yung Ryn, Aravind Machiry, Gustafson, Eric D, Chad Spensky, Chris Salls, Nick Stephens, Ruoyu Wang, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, & Giovanni Vigna. BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments.. United States.
Choe, Yung Ryn, Aravind Machiry, Gustafson, Eric D, Chad Spensky, Chris Salls, Nick Stephens, Ruoyu Wang, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. Wed . "BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments.". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1426538.
@article{osti_1426538,
title = {BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments.},
author = {Choe, Yung Ryn and Aravind Machiry and Gustafson, Eric D and Chad Spensky and Chris Salls and Nick Stephens and Ruoyu Wang and Antonio Bianchi and Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Conference:
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