skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Quantitative Risk Analytic Approaches to Collaborative Nuclear Security Development.


Abstract not provided.

Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the 15th PIIC Conference on Disarmament and Nuclear Security held November 1-4, 2016 in Suzhou, China.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Reinhardt, Jason Christian. Quantitative Risk Analytic Approaches to Collaborative Nuclear Security Development.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Reinhardt, Jason Christian. Quantitative Risk Analytic Approaches to Collaborative Nuclear Security Development.. United States.
Reinhardt, Jason Christian. Wed . "Quantitative Risk Analytic Approaches to Collaborative Nuclear Security Development.". United States. doi:.
title = {Quantitative Risk Analytic Approaches to Collaborative Nuclear Security Development.},
author = {Reinhardt, Jason Christian},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}

Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share:
  • The need to share software and reintegrate it into new applications presents a difficult but important challenge. Component-based development as an approach to this problem is receiving much attention in professional journals and academic curricula. However, there are many other approaches to collaborative software development that might be more appropriate. This paper reviews a few of these approaches and discusses criteria for the conditions and contexts in which these alternative approaches might be more appropriate. This paper complements the discussion of context-based development team organizations and processes. Examples from a small development team that interacts with a larger professional communitymore » are analyzed.« less
  • Political and fiscal considerations are driving safeguards and security policy changes. Frequent topics of discussion as a means of addressing both cost effectiveness and the perceived reduction in threat to Department of Energy facilities is to change the current valuation of the Frequency of Attack in the ``Conditional risk Equation`` to a value which reflects this low probability of attack. A major premise of this paper is that the low probability of an attack on a nuclear facility in the United States is due to the level of deterrence, mitigation, and prevention of the protection systems, not a lack ofmore » adversary interest in nuclear facilities. Though nuclear facilities would seem to be ideal attention getting targets for terrorists, the protection system has a deterrent effect, making them ``hard`` targets, thus lowering the probability that they will be attacked. The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to taking credit for those qualitative protection system elements which effect the probability that an attack will occur against a sensitive facility in the United States. Complex problems such as assessing values to large and multi-faceted protection programs require a rigorous analytical approach. Analytic tools can assist in breaking down large, complex problems into their component parts. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a methodology which is ideally suited for structuring complex problems such as determining how effective the qualitative protection system elements are against a given adversary type and across a specific path to a target. This approach is rigorous, provides significant detail on the rationale for decisions made, and is flexible in adjusting to changing situations. Examples chosen to demonstrate this rigorous methodology are insider adversary types within the DOE ``Design Basis Threat`` policy.« less
  • Abstract not provided.
  • Between February 1989 and February 1994, Environment Canada completed ecological assessments on 44 substances, mixtures and effluents as mandated under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). Most of these assessments relied on the quotient method in which an estimated environmental concentration was divided by the estimated effects threshold for sensitive endpoints. Quotients were calculated for different endpoints at sites in Canada, and substances having quotients > 1 were declared ``toxic`` as defined under CEPA. While this approach was effective in identifying the need for management actions, the authors initiated a review of quantitative risk assessment methods that are currently availablemore » or under development. The purpose was to determine if such methods (1) provide a more thorough understanding of the risks posed by priority substances released to the Canadian environment and (2) are feasible given the data and time constraints of the CEPA regulatory program. The methods investigated included Monte Carlo simulations and fuzzy arithmetics to explicitly estimate quotient uncertainty, and food web models that estimate risks arising from both direct and indirect effects. This presentation will discuss the results of these analyses for several priority substances, with regard to the feasibility, cost and benefits of using quantitative risk assessment methods in the CEPA regulatory program.« less