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Title: Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities

Abstract

After completing this session, you should be able to: Describe the Insider Threat; Characterize the cyber insider threat; Describe preventive measures against the insider threat; Describe protective measures against the insider threat.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)
OSTI Identifier:
1418782
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-18-20607
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS; Insider threat; nuclear facilities

Citation Formats

West, Rebecca Lynn. Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. United States: N. p., 2018. Web. doi:10.2172/1418782.
West, Rebecca Lynn. Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. United States. doi:10.2172/1418782.
West, Rebecca Lynn. 2018. "Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities". United States. doi:10.2172/1418782. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1418782.
@article{osti_1418782,
title = {Insider Threat to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities},
author = {West, Rebecca Lynn},
abstractNote = {After completing this session, you should be able to: Describe the Insider Threat; Characterize the cyber insider threat; Describe preventive measures against the insider threat; Describe protective measures against the insider threat.},
doi = {10.2172/1418782},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2018,
month = 1
}

Technical Report:

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  • This document is a review of the Nuclear Security Insider Threat Exercise which was hosted at ORNL in July 2013. Nuclear security culture and the insider threat are best learned through experience. Culture is inherently difficult to teach, and as such is best learned through modeled behaviors and learning exercise. This TTX, NSITE, is a tool that strives to aid students in learning what an effective (and ineffective) nuclear security culture might look like by simulating dynamic events that strengthen or weaken the nuclear security regime. The goals of NSITE are to stimulate complex thought and discussion and assist decisionmore » makers and management in determining the most effective policies and procedures for their country or facility.« less
  • Seven case studies are presented. The cases include thefts of various materials and sabotage. For each case there is an overview of the incident, a timeline, a profile of the perpetrator, and a discussion of the security system failures which allowed the incident to take place.
  • In recent years, insider threat programs have become an important aspect of nuclear security, and nuclear security training courses. However, many nuclear security insider threat programs fail to address the insider threat attack and monitoring potential that exists on information technology (IT) systems. This failure is critical because of the importance of information technology and networks in today’s world. IT systems offer an opportunity to perpetrate dangerous insider attacks, but they also present an opportunity to monitor for them and prevent them. This paper suggests a number of best practices for monitoring and preventing insider attacks on IT systems, andmore » proposes the development of a new IT insider threat tabletop that can be used to help train nuclear security practitioners on how best to implement IT insider threat prevention best practices. The development of IT insider threat best practices and a practical tabletop exercise will allow nuclear security practitioners to improve nuclear security trainings as it integrates a critical part of insider threat prevention into the broader nuclear security system.« less
  • Guidance is presented for the development of work rules that will assist in protecting nuclear fuel facilities against the threat of employee collusion. Evaluation criteria for safeguards performance against this threat are discussed. Five types of work rules are presented: area zoning, function zoning, team zoning, time zoning and operation zoning. The strengths and weaknesses of each are discussed and examples are given. Methods for optimization of work rules are described.