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Title: Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

Authors:
 [1];  [1]
  1. National Security Technologies, LLC, Mercury, Nevada
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Nevada Test Site/National Security Technologies, LLC (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Programs (DP) (NA-10)
OSTI Identifier:
1413523
Report Number(s):
DOE/NV/25946-3229
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC52-06NA25946
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 58th Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, California, July 16-20, 2017
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS; programmatic value, accountable nuclear materials, termination of safeguards, determination nuclear

Citation Formats

Price, Mary Alice, and Harris, Laura. Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Price, Mary Alice, & Harris, Laura. Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site. United States.
Price, Mary Alice, and Harris, Laura. 2017. "Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1413523.
@article{osti_1413523,
title = {Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site},
author = {Price, Mary Alice and Harris, Laura},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 7
}

Conference:
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  • Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material hasmore » been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.« less
  • In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America’s nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accuratelymore » assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in “green” technology.« less
  • In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America’s nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accuratelymore » assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization and improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in “green” technology.« less
  • Quantitative modeling of the potential for contaminant transport from sources associated with underground nuclear testing at Yucca Flat is an important part of the strategy to develop closure plans for the residual contamination. At Yucca Flat, the most significant groundwater resource that could potentially be impacted is the Lower Carbonate Aquifer (LCA), a regionally extensive aquifer that supplies a significant portion of the water demand at the Nevada National Security Site, formerly the Nevada Test Site. Developing and testing reasonable models of groundwater flow in this aquifer is an important precursor to performing subsequent contaminant transport modeling used to forecastmore » contaminant boundaries at Yucca Flat that are used to identify potential use restriction and regulatory boundaries. A model of groundwater flow in the LCA at Yucca Flat has been developed. Uncertainty in this model, as well as other transport and source uncertainties, is being evaluated as part of the Underground Testing Area closure process. Several alternative flow models of the LCA in the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU have been developed. These flow models are used in conjunction with contaminant transport models and source term models and models of contaminant transport from underground nuclear tests conducted in the overlying unsaturated and saturated alluvial and volcanic tuff rocks to evaluate possible contaminant migration in the LCA for the next 1,000 years. Assuming the flow and transport models are found adequate by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, the models will undergo a peer review. If the model is approved by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, it will be used to identify use restriction and regulatory boundaries at the start of the Corrective Action Decision Document Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. These initial boundaries may be revised at the time of the Closure Report phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. (authors)« less
  • Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is one type of sensitive information that DOE employees, including computer users, must now identify and protect. Guidelines to identify information as UCNI are gradually being put in place. The publication of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Topical Guideline for Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security, TG-FSSS-1, is a major step in the development of UCNI guidelines. This DOE published guide cuts across and addresses many different programmatic areas including automated data processing. Our local guideline, Los Alamos National Laboratory Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Guideline for Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security, IG-LAFSSS-1, is based on TG-FSSS-1. In this paper,more » I plan to discuss the background of UCNI, the definition of UCNI, information that qualifies as UCNI, the consequences of information being UCNI, the development of UCNI guidelines, TG-FSSS-1 and IG-LAFSSS-1, the relationship of UCNI to classification, and the implementation of the IG-LAFSSS-1 at Los Alamos.« less