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Title: NNL and NR Facilities and Infrastructure Visit LANL Construction Overview

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1409815
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-17-30683
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Naval Reactors visit to LANL ; 2017-07-18 - 2017-07-18 ; Los Alamos, New Mexico, United States
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Renfro, Steven Loyd. NNL and NR Facilities and Infrastructure Visit LANL Construction Overview. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Renfro, Steven Loyd. NNL and NR Facilities and Infrastructure Visit LANL Construction Overview. United States.
Renfro, Steven Loyd. Tue . "NNL and NR Facilities and Infrastructure Visit LANL Construction Overview". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1409815.
@article{osti_1409815,
title = {NNL and NR Facilities and Infrastructure Visit LANL Construction Overview},
author = {Renfro, Steven Loyd},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Nov 21 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Tue Nov 21 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Conference:
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  • Abstract not provided.
  • Actions of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have precipitated two nuclear crises in the past 10 years. The 1994 crisis was resolved through the 'Agreed Framework.' North Korea agreed to 'freeze' and eventually dismantle its nuclear program (with U.S. help to store spent fuel safely and under IAEA inspection). In return, the United States agreed (with the KEDO international consortium) to build two light-water reactors and supply North Korea with heavy-fuel oil until the reactors come on line. In addition, both sides agreed to move towards full normalization of relations, work for peace and security onmore » a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and work on strengthening the international nonproliferation regime. The second nuclear crisis erupted when North Korean Government officials allegedly admitted to having a clandestine uranium enrichment program when confronted with this accusation by U.S. officials in October 2002. The United States (through KEDO) suspended heavy-fuel oil shipments and North Korea responded by expelling the IAEA inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and restarting its nuclear program in January 2003. The North Korean Government has invited Professor John Lewis of Stanford University, a China and North Korea scholar, for Track I1 discussions of nuclear and other key issues since 1987. In August 2003, Professor Lewis visited North Korea just before the first six-party talks, which were designed by the United States to solve the current nuclear crisis. Professor Lewis was invited back for the January 2004 visit. He asked Jack Pritchard, former U.S. special envoy for DRPK negotiations, and me to accompany him. Two Asian affairs staff specialists from the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee also joined us. I will report on the visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center on January 8,2004. We toured the 5 MWe reactor, the 50 MWe reactor construction site, the spent fuel pool storage building, and the radiochemical laboratory. We concluded that North Korea has restarted its 5 MWe reactor (which produces roughly 6 kg of plutonium annually), it removed the 8000 spent fuel rods that were previously stored under IAEA safeguards from the spent fuel pool, and that it most likely extracted the 25 to 30 kg of plutonium contained in these fuel rods. Although North Korean officials showed us what they claimed was their plutonium metal product from this reprocessing campaign, we were not able to conclude definitively that it was in fact plutonium metal and that it came from the most recent reprocessing campaign. Nevertheless, our North Korean hosts demonstrated that they had the capability, the facility and requisite capacity, and the technical expertise to produce plutonium metal. We were not shown any facilities or had the opportunity to talk to technical or military experts who were able to address the issue of whether or not North Korea had a 'deterrent' as claimed - that is, we were not able to conclude that North Korea can build a nuclear device and that it can integrate nuclear devices into suitable delivery systems. On the matter of uranium enrichment programs, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan categorically denied that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program - he said, 'we have no program, no equipment, and no technical expertise for uranium enrichment.' Upon return to the United States, I shared my observations and analysis with U.S. Government officials in Washington, DC, including congressional testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and briefings to two House of Representative Committees.« less