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Title: A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar

Abstract

In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1404836
Report Number(s):
LLNL-TR-737335
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-07NA27344
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS; 97 MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE

Citation Formats

Soper, Braden C. A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1404836.
Soper, Braden C. A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar. United States. doi:10.2172/1404836.
Soper, Braden C. 2017. "A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar". United States. doi:10.2172/1404836. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1404836.
@article{osti_1404836,
title = {A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar},
author = {Soper, Braden C.},
abstractNote = {In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.},
doi = {10.2172/1404836},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 8
}

Technical Report:

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