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Title: Report Summarizing the Effort Required to Initiate Welding of Irradiated Materials within the Welding Cubicle

Abstract

The advanced welding facility within a hot cell at the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which has been jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program and the Electric Power Research Institute, Long Term Operations Program and the Welding and Repair Technology Center, is in the final phase of development. Research and development activities in this facility will involve direct testing of advanced welding technologies on irradiated materials in order to address the primary technical challenge of helium induced cracking that can arise when conventional fusion welding techniques are utilized on neutron irradiated stainless steels and nickel-base alloys. This report details the effort that has been required since the beginning of fiscal year 2017 to initiate welding research and development activities on irradiated materials within the hot cell cubicle, which houses welding sub-systems that include laser beam welding (LBW) and friction stir welding (FSW) and provides material containment within the hot cell.

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2];  [2]
  1. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Palo Alto, CA (United States)
  2. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1399995
Report Number(s):
ORNL/TM-2017/335
75659
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE

Citation Formats

Frederick, Greg, Sutton, Benjamin J., Tatman, Jonathan K., Vance, Mark Christopher, Smith, Allen W., Clark, Scarlett R., Feng, Zhili, Miller, Roger G., Chen, Jian, Tang, Wei, Hu, Xunxiang, and Gibson, Brian T. Report Summarizing the Effort Required to Initiate Welding of Irradiated Materials within the Welding Cubicle. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1399995.
Frederick, Greg, Sutton, Benjamin J., Tatman, Jonathan K., Vance, Mark Christopher, Smith, Allen W., Clark, Scarlett R., Feng, Zhili, Miller, Roger G., Chen, Jian, Tang, Wei, Hu, Xunxiang, & Gibson, Brian T. Report Summarizing the Effort Required to Initiate Welding of Irradiated Materials within the Welding Cubicle. United States. doi:10.2172/1399995.
Frederick, Greg, Sutton, Benjamin J., Tatman, Jonathan K., Vance, Mark Christopher, Smith, Allen W., Clark, Scarlett R., Feng, Zhili, Miller, Roger G., Chen, Jian, Tang, Wei, Hu, Xunxiang, and Gibson, Brian T. Thu . "Report Summarizing the Effort Required to Initiate Welding of Irradiated Materials within the Welding Cubicle". United States. doi:10.2172/1399995. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1399995.
@article{osti_1399995,
title = {Report Summarizing the Effort Required to Initiate Welding of Irradiated Materials within the Welding Cubicle},
author = {Frederick, Greg and Sutton, Benjamin J. and Tatman, Jonathan K. and Vance, Mark Christopher and Smith, Allen W. and Clark, Scarlett R. and Feng, Zhili and Miller, Roger G. and Chen, Jian and Tang, Wei and Hu, Xunxiang and Gibson, Brian T.},
abstractNote = {The advanced welding facility within a hot cell at the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), which has been jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy, Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program and the Electric Power Research Institute, Long Term Operations Program and the Welding and Repair Technology Center, is in the final phase of development. Research and development activities in this facility will involve direct testing of advanced welding technologies on irradiated materials in order to address the primary technical challenge of helium induced cracking that can arise when conventional fusion welding techniques are utilized on neutron irradiated stainless steels and nickel-base alloys. This report details the effort that has been required since the beginning of fiscal year 2017 to initiate welding research and development activities on irradiated materials within the hot cell cubicle, which houses welding sub-systems that include laser beam welding (LBW) and friction stir welding (FSW) and provides material containment within the hot cell.},
doi = {10.2172/1399995},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Thu Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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