Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities

Rao, Nageswara S.; Ma, Chris Y. T.; Hausken, Kjell; He, Fei; Yau, David K. Y.; Zhuang, Jun

doi:10.1109/MFI.2017.8170351

Title: Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities

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Abstract

We consider an infrastructure of networked systems with discrete components that can be reinforced at certain costs to guard against attacks. The communications network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between the systems. We characterize the correlations within this infrastructure at two levels using (a) aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability giventhe failure of an individual system or network, and (b) first order differential conditions on system survival probabilities that characterize component-level correlations. We formulate an infrastructure survival game between an attacker and a provider, who attacks and reinforces individual components, respectively. They use the composite utility functions composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, and the previously studiedsum-form and product-form utility functions are their special cases. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for individual system survival probabilities and the expected total number of operational components. We apply and discuss these estimates for a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure

Authors:

^[1]; Ma, Chris Y. T. ^[2]; Hausken, Kjell ^[3]; He, Fei ^[4]; Yau, David K. Y. ^[5]; Zhuang, Jun ^[6]

ORNL
Hang Seng Management College, Hon Kong
University of Stavanger, Norway
Texas A&M University, Kingsville, TX, USA
Singapore University of Technology and Design
University at Buffalo (SUNY)

Publication Date:: 2017-11-01

Research Org.:: Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE Office of Science (SC), Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR); USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

OSTI Identifier:: 1399416

DOE Contract Number:: AC05-00OR22725

Resource Type:: Conference

Resource Relation:: Conference: IEEE International Conference on Multisensor Fusion and Integration for Intelligent Systems - Daegu, , South Korea - 11/27/2017 5:00:00 AM-11/29/2017 5:00:00 AM

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Citation Formats


                    Rao, Nageswara S., Ma, Chris Y. T., Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David K. Y., and Zhuang, Jun. Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities.  United States: N. p., 2017. 
        Web.  doi:10.1109/MFI.2017.8170351.

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                    Rao, Nageswara S., Ma, Chris Y. T., Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David K. Y., & Zhuang, Jun. Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities.  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1109/MFI.2017.8170351

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                    Rao, Nageswara S., Ma, Chris Y. T., Hausken, Kjell, He, Fei, Yau, David K. Y., and Zhuang, Jun. 2017.  
        "Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities".  United States.  https://doi.org/10.1109/MFI.2017.8170351.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1399416.

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@article{osti_1399416,

  title        = {Defense strategies for asymmetric networked systems under composite utilities},

  author       = {Rao, Nageswara S. and Ma, Chris Y. T. and Hausken, Kjell and He, Fei and Yau, David K. Y. and Zhuang, Jun},

  abstractNote = {We consider an infrastructure of networked systems with discrete components that can be reinforced at certain costs to guard against attacks. The communications network plays a critical, asymmetric role of providing the vital connectivity between the systems. We characterize the correlations within this infrastructure at two levels using (a) aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability giventhe failure of an individual system or network, and (b) first order differential conditions on system survival probabilities that characterize component-level correlations. We formulate an infrastructure survival game between an attacker and a provider, who attacks and reinforces individual components, respectively. They use the composite utility functions composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, and the previously studiedsum-form and product-form utility functions are their special cases. At Nash Equilibrium, we derive expressions for individual system survival probabilities and the expected total number of operational components. We apply and discuss these estimates for a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure},

  doi          = {10.1109/MFI.2017.8170351},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1399416},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {2017},

  month        = {11}

}

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