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Title: Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.


Abstract not provided.

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Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
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DOE Contract Number:
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Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting in Atlanta , GA, USA from 07/25/2016 - 07/28/2016 held July 25-28, 2016 in Atlanta, GA, United States of America.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, and Reimold, Benjamin. Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, & Reimold, Benjamin. Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.. United States.
Glaser, Alexander, Brotz, Jay Kristoffer, Kim, Andrew, Steingart, Dan, and Reimold, Benjamin. Thu . "Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.". United States. doi:.
title = {Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept.},
author = {Glaser, Alexander and Brotz, Jay Kristoffer and Kim, Andrew and Steingart, Dan and Reimold, Benjamin},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Thu Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016}

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  • Abstract not provided.
  • Abstract not provided.
  • Arms control treaties that reduce the number of deployable nuclear-warhead delivery systems might also lead to provisions for the verified dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Based on public information and very simple conceptual models of nuclear warheads, one can visualize a set of procedural and technological requirements to account for warheads removed from deployed sites and ultimately dismantled. To accomplish the accounting function, verification-quality tags and/or seals might be needed in order that the warheads taken out of storage can be tracked to the dismantlement site. These tags/seals would represent an overlay on the existing chain of custody. The verified dismantlementmore » of the warheads poses special problems in confirming their identity and in avoiding the loss of sensitive information. A central factor is the publicly recognized need for some minimum quantity of fissile material to constitute a nuclear warhead. A measurement system that could make such a determination without giving away unnecessary information would be desired. Some approaches based on existing fissile assay methods are discussed. 1 ref., 2 figs.« less
  • The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the keymore » points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.« less