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Title: Discussion of Key Technical Issues Re: Components of the Safety Case.

Abstract

Abstract not provided.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1380076
Report Number(s):
SAND2016-8480C
647010
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the 7th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research, Design, and Operation held September 7-9, 2016 in Washington, DC.
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Sevougian, S. David. Discussion of Key Technical Issues Re: Components of the Safety Case.. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Sevougian, S. David. Discussion of Key Technical Issues Re: Components of the Safety Case.. United States.
Sevougian, S. David. Mon . "Discussion of Key Technical Issues Re: Components of the Safety Case.". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1380076.
@article{osti_1380076,
title = {Discussion of Key Technical Issues Re: Components of the Safety Case.},
author = {Sevougian, S. David},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Mon Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016}
}

Conference:
Other availability
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