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Title: Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective

Abstract

This short research paper addresses two topics that have emerged in the debate about whether, when, and how to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.1 The first topic relates to the size and scale of the planned nuclear force, with some critics of the modernization plan arguing that the United States is simply replicating the Cold War force for a very different era. The second topic relates to the cost of the modernization effort, with some critics arguing that the cost is unaffordable.2 This paper begins with a review of the changes in the size and scale of U.S. nuclear forces since the Cold War. It then examines the expected costs of modernization in a comparative perspective.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1378526
Report Number(s):
LLNL-TR-732241
TRN: US1800561
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-07NA27344
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; NUCLEAR FORCES; COST; REVIEWS; USA

Citation Formats

Tapia-Jimenez, D. Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1378526.
Tapia-Jimenez, D. Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective. United States. doi:10.2172/1378526.
Tapia-Jimenez, D. Wed . "Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective". United States. doi:10.2172/1378526. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1378526.
@article{osti_1378526,
title = {Modernization of US Nuclear Forces: Costs in Perspective},
author = {Tapia-Jimenez, D.},
abstractNote = {This short research paper addresses two topics that have emerged in the debate about whether, when, and how to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.1 The first topic relates to the size and scale of the planned nuclear force, with some critics of the modernization plan arguing that the United States is simply replicating the Cold War force for a very different era. The second topic relates to the cost of the modernization effort, with some critics arguing that the cost is unaffordable.2 This paper begins with a review of the changes in the size and scale of U.S. nuclear forces since the Cold War. It then examines the expected costs of modernization in a comparative perspective.},
doi = {10.2172/1378526},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Apr 12 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Wed Apr 12 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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