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Title: SAVY 4000 Container Filter Design Life and Extension Implementation

Abstract

The SAVY 4000 is a general purpose, reusable container for the storage of solid nuclear material inside a nuclear facility. The canister has a permitted loading for material with a thermal output not to exceed 25 watts. This wattage limit applies to all containers, regardless of their size.

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1377375
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-15-22395
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
42 ENGINEERING; Radiation Protection

Citation Formats

Moore, Murray E., Reeves, Kirk Patrick, Veirs, Douglas Kirk, Smith, Paul Herrick, and Stone, Timothy Amos. SAVY 4000 Container Filter Design Life and Extension Implementation. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1377375.
Moore, Murray E., Reeves, Kirk Patrick, Veirs, Douglas Kirk, Smith, Paul Herrick, & Stone, Timothy Amos. SAVY 4000 Container Filter Design Life and Extension Implementation. United States. doi:10.2172/1377375.
Moore, Murray E., Reeves, Kirk Patrick, Veirs, Douglas Kirk, Smith, Paul Herrick, and Stone, Timothy Amos. 2017. "SAVY 4000 Container Filter Design Life and Extension Implementation". United States. doi:10.2172/1377375. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1377375.
@article{osti_1377375,
title = {SAVY 4000 Container Filter Design Life and Extension Implementation},
author = {Moore, Murray E. and Reeves, Kirk Patrick and Veirs, Douglas Kirk and Smith, Paul Herrick and Stone, Timothy Amos},
abstractNote = {The SAVY 4000 is a general purpose, reusable container for the storage of solid nuclear material inside a nuclear facility. The canister has a permitted loading for material with a thermal output not to exceed 25 watts. This wattage limit applies to all containers, regardless of their size.},
doi = {10.2172/1377375},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 8
}

Technical Report:

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  • The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M441.1-1 /sup>1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” In order to ensure continuing safe storage of nuclear material and the maximization of risk reduction, TA-55 has established a Surveillance Program to ensure storage container integrity for operations within its specified design life. The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan2 defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. A long-term surveillance planmore » will be established based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies as defined in the Accelerated Aging Plan3. This report details progress in positioning the Surveillance Program for successful implementation in FY14 and status of the Design Life Extension Program in terms of its implementation and data collection for FY13.« less
  • The 3-year accelerated aging study of the SAVY-4000 O-ring shows very little evidence of significant degradation to samples subjected to aggressive elevated temperature and radiation conditions. Whole container thermal aging studies followed by helium leakage testing and compression set measurements were used to establish an estimate for a failure criterion for O-ring compression set of ≥65 %. The whole container aging studies further show that the air flow and efficiency functions of the filter do not degrade significantly after thermal aging. However, the degradation of the water-resistant function leads to water penetration failure after four months at 210°C, but doesmore » not cause failure after 10 months at 120°C (130°C is the maximum operating temperature for the PTFE membrane). The thermal aging data for O-ring compression set do not meet the assumptions of standard time-temperature superposition analysis for accelerated aging studies. Instead, the data suggest that multiple degradation mechanisms are operative, with a reversible mechanism operative at low aging temperatures and an irreversible mechanism dominating at high aging temperatures. To distinguish between these mechanisms, we have measured compression set after allowing the sample to physically relax, thereby minimizing the effect of the reversible mechanism. The resulting data were analyzed using two distinct mathematical methods to obtain a lifetime estimate based on chemical degradation alone. Both methods support a lifetime estimate of greater than 150 years at 80°C. Although the role of the reversible mechanism is not fully understood, it is clear that the contribution to the total compression set is small in comparison to that due to the chemical degradation mechanism. To better understand the chemical degradation mechanism, thermally aged O-ring samples have been characterized by Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR), Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR), Gel Permeation Chromatography (GPC), and Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC). These experiments detect no significant O-ring degradation below 80°C. Furthermore, durometer measurements indicate that there is no significant change in O-ring hardness at all aging conditions examined. Therefore, our current conservative lifetime estimate for the O-ring and the filter is 10 years at 80°C. In FY17, we will continue to probe the chemical degradation mechanism using oxygen consumption measurements under accelerated aging conditions to reveal temperatures at which oxidation occurs, along with any differences in oxidation rate at the low vs. high aging temperatures. We will also refine the failure criteria and finalize the radiation/thermal synergistic studies to determine a final design lifetime.« less
  • Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) has been investigated as a potential failure mechanism for the SAVY 4000 and the Hagan containers used to store plutonium-bearing materials at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This report discusses the regions of the container bodies most susceptible to SCC and the magnitude of the residual stresses in those regions. Boiling MgCl2 testing indicated that for both containers the region near the top weld was most susceptible to SCC. The Hagan showed through wall cracking after 22-24 hours of exposure both parallel (axial stresses) and perpendicular (hoop stresses) to the weld. The SAVY 4000 container showedmore » significant cracking above and below the weld after 47 hours of exposure but there was no visual evidence of a through wall crack and the cracks did not leak water. Two through wall holes formed in the bottom of the SAVY 4000 container after 44-46 hours of exposure. For both containers, average “through wall” residual stresses were determined from hole drilling data 4 mm below the weld. In the Hagan body, average tensile hoop stresses were 194 MPa and average compressive axial stresses were -120 MPa. In the SAVY 4000 body, average compressive hoop stresses were 11 MPa and average tensile axial stresses were 25 MPa. Results suggest that because the Hagan container exhibited through wall cracking in a shorter time in boiling MgCl2 and had the higher average tensile stress, 194 MPa hoop stress, it is more susceptible to SCC than the SAVY 4000 container.« less